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COPYRIGHT AND THE BRAIN
MARK BARTHOLOMEW*
ABSTRACT
This Article explores the intersection of copyright law, aesthetic theory,
and neuroscience. The current test for copyright infringement requires a
court or jury to assess whether the parties’ works are “substantially
similar” from the vantage point of the “ordinary observer.” Embedded
within this test are several assumptions about audiences and art. Brain
science calls these assumptions into question. The substantial similarity test
posits that aesthetic reactions are unmeasurable and uniform. In actuality,
they can be quantified and vary depending on audience and artistic medium.
Neuroscience has already reconfigured the law in many areas, from tort
damages to the death penalty. Now it may offer copyright law a way
forward, opening up the black box of aesthetic encounters to reveal what is
most salient when making the comparison at the heart of copyright
infringement. Three suggested reforms—admitting expert testimony to
tailor the substantial similarity test to different kinds of artistic works, using
survey evidence to better understand the aesthetic responses of specialized
audiences, and reordering the infringement analysis to debias judges and
jurors—deploy the insights of neuroaesthetics to improve the law of
copyright infringement.
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INTRODUCTION
Nobody likes the current test for copyright infringement. A court or jury
determining whether illegal copying occurred must assess whether the
plaintiff’s and defendant’s works are “substantially similar” from the
vantage point of the “ordinary observer.” 1 A frequent punching bag for
intellectual property scholars, the substantial similarity test has been
described as “mak[ing] no sense,”2 “notoriously confusing and confused,”3
1.
See, e.g., Tanksley v. Daniels, 902 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2018); Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc.,
883 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2018).
2.
Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 719 (2010).
3.
Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV.
683, 716–17 (2012).
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and “a virtual black hole in copyright jurisprudence.”4
Judges feel no better about the test. Early on, a court complained of the
ordinary observer analysis’s “artificial and disappointingly inaccurate
application.”5 Another prophesized that the test would prevent judges and
juries from making “an intelligible and intellectual decision” on the question
of infringement.6 The passage of time did not make things any better. One
court of appeals deemed the test “of doubtful value” given its interplay with
other parts of copyright law.7 Or, as another court opined, the “essential
question” of how to compare two works for purposes of substantial
similarity has not been answered “[a]fter 200 years of wrestling with
copyright questions, [and] it is unlikely that courts will come up with the
answer any time soon, if indeed there is ‘an’ answer, which we doubt.”8
To a large degree, these complaints reflect a larger skepticism of the
ability of one person to comprehend the aesthetic experience of another. The
substantial similarity test, also referred to as the “audience test,”9 requires
art to be appreciated from the perspective of its intended audience. As
formulated by the federal courts, “the essence of the audience test is its focus
on viewers’ spontaneous reaction” to the infringing work.10 These courts
assume that human reactions to art are inherently subjective and, therefore,
not susceptible to objective analysis or outside expertise.
As a result, decisionmaking in copyright cases remains particularly
opaque as courts largely abdicate any role in policing what can be relied on
when comparing the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s works. 11 This has
negative consequences, including making infringement disputes
unpredictable and difficult to resolve before trial. 12 Rather than base
copyright infringement on a phenomenon incapable of measurement, some
law professors, including the author of the most-cited treatise on copyright
4.
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Questionable Origins of the Copyright Infringement Analysis,
68 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2016).
5.
Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 536 (2d Cir. 1938).
6.
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 476 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting).
7.
Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232–33 (3d Cir. 1986).
8.
Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990).
9.
Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 854 (6th Cir. 2003).
10.
4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[E][3][a][ii]
(2019).
11.
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (“The test
for infringement of copyright is of necessity vague.”); see also Blehm v. Jacobs, 702 F.3d 1193, 1202
(10th Cir. 2012) (“We have not defined the ‘outer limits’ of substantial similarity, likely because the line
between substantial similarity and no substantial similarity is imprecise.”); Lyons P’ship v. Morris
Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801 (4th Cir. 2001) (admitting that “[t]he notion of intrinsic similarity
can be a slippery one”).
12.
Joseph P. Fishman, Music as a Matter of Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1870 (2018); Pamela
Samuelson, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright Infringement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1821,
1837 (2013); Lemley, supra note 2, at 739–40.
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law, call for the audience test’s wholesale abandonment.13
Maybe there is a way to rehabilitate copyright infringement doctrine
without junking the audience test. Brain science offers the potential for a
much richer portrait of the aesthetic experience. “Neuroaesthetics is the
study of the neural processes that underlie aesthetic behavior.” 14
Neuroscientists have identified several regions and processes in the brain
central to appreciating creative works and are continuing to develop the
field. 15 Using new technologies for measuring blood flow and electrical
activity in the brain, researchers examine the neural indicia of attention,
novelty, emotional response, and even the perception of beauty that are part
of the aesthetic experience. In this way, brain science may offer copyright
law a way forward, opening up the black box of aesthetic encounters to
reveal which things are most salient when making the comparison at the
heart of copyright infringement.
This is not to say that brain scans have suddenly laid bare the entire
process of aesthetic judgment. Today’s imaging technologies lack the
spatial resolution and speed needed to capture all of the complexities of
human thought, including thoughts about art, music, and literature. The
brain regions and processes identified as being part of the aesthetic
experience also perform other functions, making it difficult to determine
which neural processes are central to aesthetic judgment.16
Nevertheless, the recent development of non-invasive techniques for
recording the biological incidents of human thought has surfaced many
insights into the experiences of audiences that were not available even a few
years ago.17 Much of the neurological activity that is involved in aesthetic
appreciation is subconscious. As a result, reports from audience members
themselves cannot do this activity justice. Brain imaging offers a window
into aesthetic encounters that we are unable to articulate ourselves.18 The
13.
See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, at § 13.03[E][1][b] (“It would seem preferable, in
short, to discard the audience test.”); Lemley, supra note 2, at 740–41; Tushnet, supra note 3, at 687–
88.
14.
Martin Skov & Oshin Vartanian, Introduction: What Is Neuroaesthetics?, in
NEUROAESTHETICS 1, 3 (Martin Skov & Oshin Vartanian eds., 2009).
15.
Marcus T. Pearce, Dahlia W. Zaidel, Oshin Vartanian, Martin Skov, Helmut Leder, Anjan
Chatterjee & Marcos Nadal, Neuroaesthetics: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience, 11
PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCH. SCI. 265, 274 (2016) (“[R]ecent studies show that aesthetic pleasure is
characterized by the tight coupling of activity in reward brain regions and sensory brain regions.”); Mark
Reybrouck, Peter Vuust & Elvira Brattico, Brain Connectivity Networks and the Aesthetic Experience
of Music, 107 BRAIN SCI. 10 of 14 (2018) (describing “target regions in the brain” that are activated in
the aesthetic reaction to music).
16.
See infra notes 225–226 and accompanying text.
17.
See infra Part II.B.
18.
See Robert L. Solso, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Art: A Preliminary fMRI Observation,
7 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 75, 77 (2000).
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substantial similarity analysis is based on judicial suppositions as to how
audiences perceive creative works as well as a belief that the aesthetic
experience cannot be measured. Neuroaesthetic research can confirm or
refute these judicial hunches with new, objective measures of art
appreciation that copyright law has long assumed could never exist.19 By
showing that our reactions to art can be measured, neuroscientific
discoveries should force an immediate reconsideration of copyright law’s
current prohibitions on the use of survey evidence and expert testimony to
better understand the audiences for creative works. By demonstrating that
our aesthetic reactions to art are formed quickly, brain science suggests that
the trier of fact should evaluate substantial similarity at the outset of a case,
not after days of testimony on other issues.
Neuroscience has already reconfigured the law in many areas outside of
copyright and appears poised for significant future influence. “[L]awyers
are introducing so-called neurobiological evidence into court more than
ever.”20 Thanks to studies of the plasticity of the developing brain, some
criminal punishments for juvenile offenders are no longer allowed.21 The
vast field of tort law now takes fMRI imaging into account; such images
were credited with forcing the National Football League into a settlement
with thousands of former players suffering from Chronic Traumatic
Encephalopathy. 22 Perhaps most analogous to the relationship between
neuroaesthetics and copyright, another intellectual property regime,
trademark law, appears poised to embrace neuroscientific evidence of
consumer perception.23
In many ways, copyright and its problematic infringement test represent
a particularly promising legal territory for neuroscientific analysis. It is true
that the intricacies of aesthetic judgment mean that it is extremely difficult
to know what a single person is thinking when staring at a picture or
listening to a song. Fortunately, the substantial similarity analysis does not
require a perfect understanding of one person’s aesthetic experience.
19.
ANJAN CHATTERJEE, THE AESTHETIC BRAIN 137 (2014) (describing neuroaesthetic study “of
aesthetic properties of objects, properties that are objective but evoke an aesthetic experience within
us”).
20.
Robbie Gonzalez, How Criminal Courts Are Putting Brains—Not People—On Trial, WIRED
(Dec. 4, 2017).
21.
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 n.5 (2012) (barring mandatory life-without-parole
sentence for juvenile offenders in homicide cases); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68–74 (2010)
(barring mandatory life-without-parole sentence for juvenile offenders in non-homicide cases); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–78 (2005) (barring the death penalty for crimes committed by juvenile
offenders).
22.
Joseph J. Avery, Picking and Choosing: Inconsistent Use of Neuroscientific Legal Evidence,
81 ALB. L. REV. 941, 959–60 (2018).
23.
Mark Bartholomew, Neuromarks, 103 MINN. L. REV. 521, 524–28 (2018).
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Instead, the audience test depends on an aggregate sense of what audiences
will think. This stands in sharp contrast to criminal law, where legal
determinations typically hinge on the mental state of a single person. If
neuroscientific evidence has already influenced criminal-law
determinations, it stands to reason that this sort of evidence may be even
more useful in an area like copyright law where the trier of fact only needs
a general sense of an audience’s overall mental state.24
This Article begins by exploring the centrality of audience reactions to
copyright infringement. Even though the experience of audiences forms the
linchpin of every infringement claim, this critical component of copyright
law has attracted relatively little academic attention. Part I explains how the
substantial similarity test requires courts and jurors to engage in a fraught
and uncertain exercise: a channeling of the thought processes of relevant
audience members. By and large, the test for infringement assumes a onesize-fits-all approach to aesthetic encounters. Whether juror or judge, the
assumption seems to be that one’s own subjective processing of the works
at issue will translate into the same broadly applicable reactions as the
original audience for the works at issue. Neuroaesthetics challenges this
universalist take. Recent studies reveal that reactions to art differ depending
on audience and on the type of creative work being processed by that
audience.
Part II demonstrates that substantial similarity also depends on certain
judicial assumptions about how human beings experience art. Courts insist
that the subjective nature of art appreciation renders it impossible to
measure. They also posit that aesthetic responses occur rapidly and are
stable. Both of these assumptions help justify the current legal approach,
which disclaims lengthy deliberation over the qualities of creative works
and bars expert testimony to aid the trier of fact’s substantial similarity
analysis. Although brain imaging confirms that our impressions of creative
works form quickly, fMRI and EEG readings show that this process does
not have to remain impervious to outside observation.
Part III turns to a normative account of the future intersection of
copyright law and neuroscience and recommends some related doctrinal
reforms. Although it is tempting to believe that any tool facilitating a better
understanding of audiences should be embraced by the courts, there are
24.
At this point, brain scans are most useful for proving and disproving general theories about
aesthetic appreciation, not for answering questions about a particular copyright dispute. It may be years
before this research can be directly employed to adjudicate individual cases and, even then, it could only
serve as an evidentiary supplement, not a replacement, for the trier of fact. In the immediate term,
however, neuroaesthetics calls into question some of the basic premises behind the substantial similarity
analysis.
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reasons for caution. We may not always trust audiences (or legal
decisionmakers channeling those audiences) to decide when a defendant’s
borrowing from the creative work of another is improper. 25 Ultimately,
where to set the line between acceptable and unacceptable copying is a
question of policy, which neuroscience can inform but not determine.
Yet if we conclude that the copyright infringement analysis warrants
some assessment of aesthetic reactions—and such assessment may be
unavoidable given copyright’s artistic subject matter—then the law should
be changed to make these assessments more transparent and better aligned
with the ways our minds actually work. Insights into the biology of aesthetic
reaction counsel three specific doctrinal reforms. Experts should be allowed
to help the trier of fact understand which aspects of a work will be most
salient to a target audience. Survey evidence should be admitted to allow
judges and juries to appreciate the variability in audience reactions that the
law has thus far ignored. The trier of fact should judge substantial similarity
quickly so as to better mimic the fast, casual review of creative works that
characterizes actual aesthetic appreciation outside of the courtroom.
I. UNDERSTANDING AUDIENCES
Jimi Hendrix first met fifteen-year-old guitarist Randy Wolfe in a New
York City music store in 1966. After some talking and jamming together,
the as-yet-unknown Hendrix invited Wolfe (whom he dubbed “Randy
California”) to sit in with his band.26 Shortly thereafter, the two had a falling
out. Hendrix moved on to superstardom. Wolfe formed a band named Spirit
that had some success, including a top 40 hit. But he never quite cracked the
big time like Hendrix.
Wolfe died in a drowning accident in 1997,27 but his music lives on in
many ways, including in the form of a blockbuster lawsuit against iconic
rock band Led Zeppelin. Wolfe’s estate sued Led Zeppelin for copyright
infringement, contending that Led Zeppelin’s song “Stairway to Heaven”
copied key portions of Wolfe’s song “Taurus.” “Stairway to Heaven” is
often rated the greatest rock song of all time, enjoying more sheet music

25.
Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 294 (1998)
(“Indeed, courts generally refuse to consider evidence of how actual people appraise the similarity
between two works precisely because those appraisals may not be appropriate for copyright law.”); see
also Fishman, supra note 12, at 1903–04 (calling for a focus only on melody for music copyright cases
even though such a focus does not match the aesthetic experience of listeners).
26.
Pierre Perrone, Obituary: Randy California, THE INDEPENDENT (Jan. 17, 1997), https://www
.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-randy-california-1283572.html.
27.
Id.
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sales and radio play than virtually any other musical composition.28 The
lawyer for Wolfe’s estate estimated that his lawsuit against Led Zeppelin
was worth $40 million.29
The dispute over “Stairway to Heaven” exemplifies many of the
frustrations courts and commentators have with the current state of
copyright infringement law. Even in high-stakes cases, the trier of fact’s
substantial similarity analysis remains largely unknowable and
underdetermined. After an initial verdict for Led Zeppelin, a Ninth Circuit
panel reversed, faulting the trial court for failing to instruct jurors that they
could find infringement based on Wolfe’s original selection or arrangement
of otherwise uncopyrightable musical elements.30 Yet some commentators
fretted such an instruction would backfire. Concerned over the jurors’ lack
of musical experience, these commentators thought the new instruction
would prompt the jury to wrongly base its substantial similarity decision on
uncopyrightable stock motifs appearing in both works. 31 More broadly,
even though the California jury hearing the case was supposed to determine
“whether the ordinary, reasonable person would find the total concept and
feel of the works to be substantially similar,”32 one might wonder whether
a different group of listeners—perhaps ones with more musical expertise or
more familiarity with 1970s rock and roll—would have a different reaction

28.
James Joiner, Did Zeppelin Steal “Stairway to Heaven?”, ESQUIRE (May 19, 2014), https://w
ww.esquire.com/entertainment/music/news/a32855/was-stairway-to-heaven-stolen/ [https://perma.cc/Z
K82-VPGM].
29.
Kory Grow, Led Zeppelin Win in “Stairway to Heaven” Trial, ROLLING STONE (June 23,
2016, 5:27 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/led-zeppelin-win-in-stairway-to-hea
ven-trial-70565/.
30.
Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2018). The Ninth Circuit elected
to hear the case en banc. It reversed the panel, concluding that there was no need for a jury instruction
as to Wolfe’s selection and arrangement given that the jury had already received instruction that an “an
original work may include or incorporate elements taken from prior works or works from the public
domain.” Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1071 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). A vigorous dissent
maintained that failure to require a selection and arrangement instruction “weakens copyright protection
for musicians by robbing them of the ability to protect a unique way of combining musical elements.”
Id. at 1089 (Ikuta, J., dissenting in part).
31.
Steve Brachman, Ninth Circuit Vacates and Remands “Stairway to Heaven” Copyright Case
Over Erroneous and Prejudicial Jury Instructions, IP WATCHDOG (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.ipwatchd
og.com/2018/10/06/ninth-circuit-vacates-remands-verdict-in-stairway-to-heaven-copyright-case/id=10
1920/ [https://perma.cc/5NVJ-GM42]; Mike Masnick, Ninth Circuit Never Misses a Chance to Mess Up
Copyright Law: Reopens Led Zeppelin “Stairway to Heaven” Case, TECHDIRT (Oct. 1, 2018, 9:33 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180928/18021040739/9th-circuit-never-misses-chance-to-mess-u
p-copyright-law-reopens-led-zeppelin-stairway-to-heaven-case.shtml [https://perma.cc/8LYL-54H9];
see also Anne Steele, Music Industry Braces for More Lawsuits on Copyrights, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5,
2019, at B1 (describing concern that $2.8 million infringement verdict against Katy Perry and her
collaborators is symptomatic of copyright infringement decisions that unfairly punish artists for using
musical elements in the public domain).
32.
Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1125 (citation omitted).
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to the two songs and reach an entirely different verdict.33
As the Led Zeppelin case illustrates, substantial similarity requires
difficult line drawing from judges while at the same time offering little
guidance or predictability for litigants. The problem largely lies in the
decision to make a particular kind of audience reaction the centerpiece of
copyright infringement without any corresponding way to ascertain the
inputs that make up that reaction. One might think that every copyright jury
should be instructed in how to appreciate the perspective of the relevant
audience. Instead, given “the abstract and intuitive nature” of the audience
test, no federal court of appeals provides district courts with model jury
instructions on the question of substantial similarity. 34 The Led Zeppelin
jury, like all triers of fact in copyright infringement disputes, faced the
daunting task of trying to recreate an audience’s experience with creative
works with no tools for understanding that experience save their own
personal responses to those works. As the Ninth Circuit affirmed, the
substantial similarity analysis demands a “subjective” comparison of the
two works, seemingly closing the door on any attempts to more precisely
identify what an audience for Wolfe’s work would find most relevant when
comparing it to “Stairway to Heaven.”35
This Part details the centrality of audience understanding to the test for
copyright infringement and explains how neuroscience can facilitate that
understanding. Substantial similarity must be assessed from the perspective
of the intended audience for the works at issue. Courts struggle both with
how to adopt the audience’s perspective and when a case warrants a
specialized approach to audience understanding. History is important here:
by seeing how the law changed over time, we can better appreciate the
assumptions about audiences embedded in today’s substantial similarity
doctrine. Neuroaesthetic research challenges those assumptions,
particularly the law’s insistence on the universality of our reactions to
creative works.
A. The Role of the Audience in Copyright Law
Copyright’s early history reflected a belief that judges could assess
similarity on their own terms and a belief that their study of the works at
issue did not need to be filtered through the gaze of an audience. In the early
33.
Stephen Carlisle, Stairway to Nowhere: Court Reverses Verdict in Favor of Led Zeppelin,
NOVA (Oct. 11, 2018), http://copyright.nova.edu/led-zeppelin/ (“The underpinnings of music theory are
complex, and not easily understood by people who are not musicians.”).
34.
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Irina D. Manta & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Judging Similarity, 100
IOWA L. REV. 267, 274–75 (2014).
35.
Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1125.
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twentieth century, courts confidently determined when “the same
impressions will be created, and the same emotions excited” by two works.36
Substantial similarity could be evaluated without regard for audience
sensibilities. Instead, the task of the judge was simply to compare the works
and determine if the defendant had borrowed too heavily from the plaintiff.
This permitted the judge to engage in an exacting scrutiny of the two works;
there was no need to avoid such scrutiny out of fear that this was not the
way the works would be processed by their actual audience.
An early illustrative example comes from the case of Sheldon v. MetroGoldwyn Pictures Corp.37 The district court judge in that matter justified his
refusal to trust the audience’s perspective over his own as well as his
decision that a film was not substantially similar to the plaintiff’s play this
way:
I must, as the trier of the facts, have a more Olympian viewpoint than
the average playgoer. I must look at the two opposing productions,
the Play and the Picture, not only comparatively, but, as it were,
genealogically.38
In review, a Second Circuit panel disagreed with the judge’s take, but
simply replaced one “Olympian viewpoint” with another, opining that it
knew infringement had occurred because “the dramatic significance of the
scenes [in the two works] is the same, almost to the letter.”39
The district judge’s temerity to nakedly assert the right to decide the case
from his particular perspective and the Second Circuit’s willingness to
interpose its own view stands in sharp contrast to the modern instruction
that substantial similarity must be evaluated through the senses of the
ordinary observer.40 Most trace the arrival of the ordinary observer test to
36.
Curwood v. Affiliated Distribs., Inc., 283 F. 223, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
37.
7 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), rev’d, 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936).
38.
Id. at 842.
39.
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936).
40.
Even when courts in this earlier era mentioned that works should be evaluated based on the
impressions they made on spectators, this was meant to train the trier of fact’s attention on how the
author intended for the work to be experienced, not to channel the sensations of intended audience
members. For example, the case of Daly v. Palmer is sometimes credited as the source of the modernday audience test. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, at § 13.03[E][2]. But that case did not “ask the
judge to put him or herself in the place of a hypothetical and undiscerning ‘ordinary’ observer.” Bruce
E. Boyden, Daly v. Palmer, or the Melodramatic Origins of the Ordinary Observer, 68 SYR. L. REV.
147, 165 (2018). Rather, because Palmer was a case about rival plays, the judge in that case explained
that he had “to focus attention on the play as performed as opposed to the play as written.” Id. So far as
possible, one was meant to experience the play as presented on the stage, not simply read its underlying
script. Substantial similarity analysis in this era did not demand adopting the perspective of an average
audience member though it did require the judge to experience the work for himself in a similar fashion
to the way it would be performed.
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the case of Arnstein v. Porter.41 Though drawing on strands of earlier case
law that highlighted the perspective of the audience,42 Arnstein cemented
the move to determine infringement based on the impressions of an ordinary
audience member, a doctrinal innovation that has achieved “canonical
status” in copyright jurisprudence.43
Ira Arnstein was a musical composer with a paranoid streak. In the 1930s
and 1940s, he launched a wave of copyright infringement lawsuits against
various well-known composers and publishers. His complaints against these
musical luminaries not only alleged infringement of his compositions, but
also included other provocative allegations. In 1945, he filed a lawsuit
against famed composer and songwriter Cole Porter. Not only had Porter
wrongfully appropriated his musical works, Arnstein contended, but he had
also hired “stooges . . . to follow me, watch me, and live in the same
apartment with me.”44
Porter moved for summary judgment, which was granted by a federal
district court. Arnstein appealed the district court’s decision to the Second
Circuit, where it was heard by a trio of legal legends: Judges Jerome Frank,
Learned Hand, and Charles Clark. The panel reversed the district court,
asserting that there were two parts to every infringement analysis—(1)
whether the defendant copied from the protected work (i.e., “copying in
fact”) and (2) whether such copying constituted “improper appropriation”—
and both were questions of fact that needed to proceed to trial if there was
“the slightest doubt.”45 Writing for the majority, Judge Frank considered it
still to be an open question as to whether Porter could have copied
Arnstein’s work, even if some of Arnstein’s allegations rang fantastic. Frank
also explained that the issue of improper appropriation (what we now call
“substantial similarity”) could not be disposed of as neatly as the district
court wished. A jury or judge must decide this issue from the vantage point
of an “ordinary lay hearer,” something that had not been done at the trial
court level. 46 Frank even suggested that a jury—so long as “tone-deaf
persons” were excluded from it—would be better at this task than out-oftouch judges unfamiliar with popular music and that, in the event of a bench
41.
154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); see, e.g., Oren Bracha, Not De Minimis: (Improper)
Appropriation in Copyright, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 139, 173–74 (2018).
42.
Arnstein harvested seeds that had been planted by other courts. As explained in a 1926 case,
“copying which is infringement must be something ‘which ordinary observations would cause to be
recognized as having been taken from’ the work of another.” Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692 (2d
Cir. 1926) (quoting King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1924)).
43.
Balganesh, supra note 4, at 801.
44.
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467.
45.
Id. at 468.
46.
Id.
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trial, a judge trying such a case should solicit the input of an advisory jury.47
Before Arnstein, being able to filter out unprotectable elements from
consideration was considered more important to evaluating substantial
similarity than conveying the audience’s overall reaction to the work. The
Sheldon judge asserted the superiority of his “Olympian” perspective over
what the plaintiff’s attorney urged, which was to consider “the impression
of the Play and the Picture on the ‘average playgoer’” in a way analogous
to “the ‘reasonable man’ in other branches of the law.” 48 The judge
explained that because both works were based on the same public-domain
element—a mid-nineteenth century trial—it made more sense to decide the
case based on an objective, legally adept perspective that could filter out
uncopyrightable similarities.49 After Arnstein, priorities flipped: it was now
considered more important to identify the impressions of the target audience
than to worry about the risk that those impressions might rely on
unprotectable ideas or expressive material from the public domain.50
Now every federal court evaluates substantial similarity from the
perspective of a lay audience.51 Even when a judge decides the issue of
improper appropriation, she is meant to do so through the lens of the
audience for the work. Arnstein’s push to make the infringement analysis
revolve around audience impressions had two primary consequences.
First, expert witnesses could not be used to inform an infringement
analysis dependent on the perceptions of laypersons. If the intended
audience for a work is one with an ordinary eye and ordinary ear for
literature, music, or art, then the opinions of experts with extraordinary
artistic sensibilities arguably offer no insight and might even bias a trier of
fact trying to guess the reactions of that audience. As a result, courts since
Arnstein have largely blocked expert testimony on the question of
substantial similarity. 52 In some jurisdictions, there is an outright

47.
Id. at 473 & n.22.
48.
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 7 F. Supp. 837, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
49.
Id.
50.
Daniel Su, Note, Substantial Similarity and Architectural Works: Filtering Out “Total
Concept and Feel”, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1851, 1875 (2007) (criticizing an infringement standard that
asks the ordinary observer to evaluate the “total concept and feel” of two architectural designs in their
entirety, thereby protecting what should be unprotectable features like “functionally determined and
standard design elements”).
51.
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, at § 13.03[E][3][d]; see, e.g., Carol Barnhart Inc. v.
Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985). An important authority on copyright law maintains
the audience test has never been recognized by the Supreme Court and that the linking of infringement
with audience reaction may even clash with the Court’s limited copyright precedent. 4 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 10, at § 13.03[E][1][b]. This argument has yet to find any traction in the lower
courts.
52.
See, e.g., Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 293–95 (6th Cir. 2004).
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prohibition on expert assistance in the substantial similarity analysis.53
Second, once the perspective of the ordinary observer became
paramount, copyright infringement claims could rarely be disposed of
before trial. After all, if the infringement analysis depended on an
assessment of what “is recognizable by an ordinary observer,” 54 then it
would seem inappropriate for the judge to substitute her opinion on
infringement for that of the lay juror. Recognizing the new paradigm,
appellate judges warned district judges away from granting summary
judgment on the basis of their own comparison of the plaintiff’s and
defendant’s works. As one early Second Circuit opinion chastised, judges
who award summary judgment to defendants “when upon a reading of the
two works it seems unlikely from their relative merits that the common
matter could have been borrowed . . . deprive the plaintiff of his day in
court.”55 Summary judgment on the issue of substantial similarity continues
to be disfavored. 56 As explained by the Ninth Circuit, “subjective
comparisons of literary works that are objectively similar in their expression
of ideas must be left to the trier of fact.”57
A final critical point is that the substantial similarity analysis is premised
on the assumption that different audiences will react to creative works in the
same way. The Arnstein decision holds that triers of fact need to experience
the works at issue subjectively, without the intrusion of expert testimony or
instructions to dissect and compare the works’ individual components. Yet
the decision also assumes that this subjective process will lead to common
conclusions instead of each juror coming up with their own idiosyncratic
analysis. 58 Otherwise, jurors should be precluded from determining
substantial similarity. One might worry that one audience member’s
reaction is likely to differ from another, causing infringement decisions to
vary based on the personal predilections of individual judges and jurors,
particularly when these decisions are not kept in check through judicial or
expert guidance. Instead, it is assumed that the trier of fact can uncover the
aesthetic essence bound up in a creative work in a way that translates across
audiences and does not require specialized training.
53.
Lemley, supra note 2, at 723.
54.
Fleischer Studios v. Ralph A. Fruendlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 1934).
55.
MacDonald v. Du Maurier, 144 F.2d 696, 701 (2d Cir. 1944).
56.
E.g., Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485, 490 (6th Cir. 2009); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d
1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1984).
57.
Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by
Skidmore v. Zeppelin, 942 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
58.
See Balganesh, supra note 4, at 856 (positing deference to the jury on the issue of substantial
similarity “derive[s] from the idea that collective decisionmaking and deliberation are likely to iron out
any individual biases and idiosyncratic biases that an individual decisionmaker (e.g., a judge) might
have”).
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Reflecting this belief in a largely universal aesthetic experience, courts
rarely consider the views of a particular audience. Most decisions fall back
on the presumption that “the response of the ordinary reasonable person”
will serve as an adequate stand-in for the target audience.59 Jury instructions
vary between asking jurors to determine whether an “ordinary reasonable
person” would find the works substantially similar to equating the concept
of the ordinary reasonable observer with the jurors themselves. 60 The
implication seems to be that jurors are a sufficient proxy for the audience
because they will have the same ultimate response to the two works as that
audience. “In most cases, when a copyrighted work will be directed at the
public in general, the court need only apply a general public formulation to
the intended audience test.”61
In “exceptional circumstances,” courts adjust the substantial similarity
analysis to consider the views of a particular audience.62 For example, in a
case involving the alleged infringement of characters from a puppet show,
the court explained that it had to confront “the particular factual issue of the
impact of the respective works upon the minds and imaginations of young
people.” 63 Even when departing from the presumption of audience
universality, however, courts do little to investigate the particular
understandings of a specialized audience. The most frequent deviation from
considering infringement from a generalized perspective is when the works
at issue are designed to appeal to children. In these cases, only the relative
inability of these observers to detect disparities is emphasized.64 More finegrained explorations of target audience sensibilities are rare,65 testifying to
the assumption that, in general, different audiences experience creative
works in the same way.66
59.
Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1358; see also Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 423 (9th Cir. 1987)
(“This Court’s ‘ear’ is as lay as they come.”) (quoting opinion below).
60.
Irina D. Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303, 1335 (2012).
61.
Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801 (4th Cir. 2001); see also WellMade Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int’l Corp., 210 F. Supp. 2d 147, 161–62 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that
a “specialized intended audience” test “has not taken root in the Second Circuit”).
62.
Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484, 491 (4th Cir. 2015) (explaining that adopting the
perspective of a specialized audience should be reserved for “exceptional circumstances”).
63.
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1166 (9th
Cir. 1977), overruled by on other grounds by Skidmore v. Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en
banc).
64.
See, e.g., Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987); Krofft, 562 F.2d 1157;
Williams v. Crichton, 860 F. Supp. 158, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
65.
Audiences with professional or technical expertise occasionally receive specialized
treatment. E.g., RGIS, LLC v. A.S.T., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-10975, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4226 at *6–7
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 22. 2008); Nat’l Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 436 (S.D. W. Va.
2003).
66.
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, 905 F.2d 731, 735–36 (4th Cir. 1990); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 10, at § 13.03[E].
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Perhaps because of this belief in aesthetic universality, courts reject
opportunities to use outside evidence to gain a better understanding of
audience differences. Surveys of representative audience members are not
admissible in copyright infringement actions.67 Take, for example, a case
involving the manufacture of action figures thought to resemble characters
from the first Star Wars film. An effort to introduce a survey of the
perceptions of children—the relevant audience for these creative works—
was rebuffed. The court explained that admitting such a survey would set
the “dangerous precedent of allowing trial by the court to be replaced by
public opinion poll.”68 Similarly, in a different matter involving a television
show alleged to infringe the Superman character, the Second Circuit
blocked consideration of survey evidence out of concern such evidence
would usurp what should be the trier of fact’s independent role in
determining substantial similarity.69
Contrast this state of affairs with the widespread use of outside evidence
of audience perception in trademark law. Courts have been much more
transparent about their own difficulties in accurately assessing the minds of
consumers in trademark cases.70 As a result, the history of trademark law
reveals a growing acceptance of outside evidence to determine issues of
likely consumer confusion as well as mark distinctiveness. 71 Survey
evidence is widely accepted and even required for some of trademark law’s
legal questions.72 For trademark infringement claims, courts deploy multifactor tests to determine the likelihood of consumer confusion from the
defendant’s activities. All of these tests call for consideration of evidence
of “actual confusion”—whether in the form of survey evidence or anecdotal
testimony—and “customer sophistication,” which allows for scrutiny of the
particularized understandings of the relevant target consuming group.73 In
sum, there is a much greater willingness to collect empirical information on
a target audience when it comes to that audience’s processing of brand
names and symbols than when it comes to an audience’s encounters with
music and literature.74
67.
3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:83 (2018).
68.
Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods., 443 F. Supp. 291, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
69.
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 245 (2d Cir. 1983).
70.
For example, Judge Richard Posner acknowledged that “judges and jurors have their own
biases and blind spots” in trying to understand the thought processes of consumers. Kraft Foods Grp.
Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 735 F.3d 735, 741 (7th Cir. 2013) (Posner, J.).
71.
Bartholomew, supra note 23, at 548–51.
72.
2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:14
(5th ed. 2018) (stating that surveys have become “almost de rigeur in litigation over genericness”).
73.
See, e.g., AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 792–93 (6th Cir. 2004).
74.
See Michael Ferdinand Sitzer, Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for
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B. Distinguishing Between Audiences Through Neuroscience
By characterizing the audience members’ experience of creative works
as both subjective and universal, the current test for copyright infringement
matches the view of the most important philosopher of aesthetics: Immanuel
Kant. Writing in the eighteenth century, Kant referred to aesthetic judgment
as “the judgment of taste,” and explained that the experience of pleasure
from art had a necessarily “subjective condition.”75 But Kant also insisted
on the commonality, or what he described as the “universal validity,” of
aesthetic encounters. As he explained, “if [someone] proclaims something
to be beautiful, then he requires the same liking from others; he then judges
not just for himself but for everyone, and speaks of beauty as if it were a
property of things.”76 Agreeing with this folk intuition about our responses
to art, Kant maintained that aesthetic judgments are like empirical
judgments (e.g., there are ten provinces in Canada) in that they claim
universal validity, although they are different from empirical judgments in
that they are based on an inner subjective response.77 In accord with Kant,
copyright’s audience test relies on the assumption that audience members
respond to creative works in their own way but somehow arrive at common
conclusions.
Neuroaesthetic research challenges this assumption. A great deal of this
research reveals audience difference. For example, brain imaging
demonstrates differences in how men and women process art and how they
experience music.78 Imagine a copyright infringement dispute involving a
Audience Reactions in Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 397–98 (1981)
(discussing trademark law’s willingness to take a more specific view of relevant audiences whereas
copyright law fails to distinguish the intended audience for the relevant works from the general public
or average observer). Part of this difference between copyright and trademark may lie in the difference
between the accessibility of each regime’s normative goals. There are complexities to both, but
trademark law is most certainly about reducing the information costs of consumers in the marketplace.
Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67, 75
(2012). Copyright law’s boundaries are more contentious, in part, because the courts have not found an
acceptable way to measure “aesthetic progress.” Barton Beebe, Bleistein, the Problem of Aesthetic
Progress, and the Making of American Copyright Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 331–48 (2017). I thank
Brian Soucek for helping me realize this point.
75.
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT § 9 at 61 (Werner S. Pluhar trans., 1987).
76.
Id. § 7 at 55–56.
77.
Nick Zangwill, Aesthetic Judgment, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed.
2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/aesthetic-judgment/ [https://perma.cc/8WF2DGTD]. See also infra Part II.
78.
See Valentina Cazzato, Sonia Mele & Cosimo Urgesi, Gender Differences in the Neural
Underpinning of Perceiving and Appreciating the Beauty of the Body, 264 BEHAV. BRAIN RES. 188,
194–95 (2014); Camilo J. Cela-Conde et al., Sex-Related Similarities and Differences in the Neural
Correlates of Beauty, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3847, 3851 (2009); Magzhan Kairanbay, John See
& Lai-Kuan Wong, Towards Demographic-Based Photographic Aesthetics Prediction for Portraitures,
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work consumed predominantly by one gender. For example, although fan
fiction is diverse and different works and genres in fan fiction can have
different readerships, most fan fiction is written by women and its audience
trends female.79 If women experience fan fiction differently from men, an
analysis of substantial similarity without attention to this difference risks
either over- or underpolicing copyright in a discriminatory manner.80
The current implementation of the audience test assumes not only that
people will respond to the same works in the same ways but that this
aesthetic experience stays the same regardless of prior experience with the
work’s style, genre, or format.81 Neuroscience offers the ability to compare
the aesthetic responses of audiences with different backgrounds and to
search for differences in their reactions. Studies reveal cognitive differences
in the ways experts and non-experts react to creative works.82 Some amount
of artistic training produces changes in “art-specific organization in the
cerebellum.” 83 As expertise increases, so does visual exploration of a
painting’s overall composition, background features, and color contrasts.
The “art-naïve,” however, spend more time looking at individual figurative
elements and figures in the painting’s center and foreground. 84 A study
examining the brain activity of architects and non-architects revealed that
only the architects retrieved information stored in memory when assessing
the aesthetic appeal of different buildings.85
in 10704 LECTURE NOTES ON COMPUTER SCI. 531, 539–41 (K. Schoeffmann et al. eds., 2018);
Alexandre N. Tuch, Javier A. Bargas-Avila & Klaus Opwis, Symmetry and Aesthetics in Web Design:
It’s a Man’s Business, 26 COMPUTERS HUMAN BEHAV. 1831, 1834–35 (2010).
79.
Tabitha Carvan, Fan Fiction is Women’s Work, OVERLAND (June 28, 2018), https://overland.
org.au/2018/06/fanfiction-is-womens-work/ (“Fanfiction surpasses romance as the most female genre
of all, with more of its readers and writers identifying as genderqueer (6 per cent) than male (4 per
cent).”).
80.
Cf. Pamela Kalinowski, The Fairest of Them All: The Creative Interests of Female Fan
Fiction Writers and the Fair Use Doctrine, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 655, 661–65 (2014)
(discussing predominantly female appeal of fan fiction as reason for revising copyright fair use).
81.
It is true that relevant expertise may disqualify someone from a copyright infringement jury.
Presumably a musicologist would be excluded from a case of musical copyright infringement, and an
art historian would be kept off a jury deciding a claim of infringement over abstract art. Yet leaving
these unusual situations to the side, the test for copyright infringement assumes that all observers are
created relatively equal and will come to a shared consensus as they compare their own aesthetic
experiences.
82.
CHATTERJEE, supra note 19, at 149; Vinoo Alluri, Petri Toiviainen, Iballa Burunat, Marina
Kliuchko, Peter Vuust & Elvira Brattico, Connectivity Patterns During Music Listening: Evidence for
Action-Based Processing in Musicians, 38 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 2955 (2017).
83.
Juan García-Prieto, Ernesto Pereda & Fernando Maestú, Neurocognitive Decoding of
Aesthetic Appreciation, in MULTIMODAL OSCILLATION-BASED CONNECTIVITY THEORY 87, 97 (S. Palva
ed. 2016).
84.
Anjan Chatterjee & Oshin Vartanian, Neuroscience of Aesthetics, 1369 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.
SCI. 172 (2016).
85.
Ulrich Kirk, Martin Skov, Mark Schram Christensen & Niels Nygaard, Brain Correlates of
Aesthetic Expertise: A Parametric fMRI Study, 69 BRAIN & COGNITION 306, 310 (2009).
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The research shows that familiarity inevitably influences perception.86
Experience triggers more attention to technique and style when rendering
an aesthetic judgment; lack of experience prompts greater reliance on
personal feelings. 87 Audiences differ wildly in their familiarity with
different art forms. For example, there is a wide disparity among the general
population in terms of musical experience. This means that one jury or judge
will likely have significantly different aesthetic responses from another.88 It
is not that some audience members are comfortable evaluating creative
works and others are not. Everyone makes aesthetic judgments, even if they
lack training or familiarity with the category of work at issue. It is just that
the means and content of these judgments differ based on who is making
the judgment and their background relationship to the work.89
Regardless of audience familiarity, the process of aesthetic judgment
changes depending on the mode of artistic expression. The substantial
similarity analysis remains the same regardless of the kind of creative work
at issue or the particular senses employed to appreciate that art. It is true that
courts display a somewhat greater comfort with literary works and, as a
result, are particularly loath to allow dissection and expert testimony in
those cases. 90 But this is by no means an established rule. In general,
copyright law does not adjust to note differences in creative formats. The
dominant assumption in copyright law is that aesthetic judgment operates
in the same fashion in one artistic context as it does in another.91
In reality, the character of our aesthetic understanding changes
86.
Adam L. Alter & Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Uniting the Tribes of Fluency to Form a
Metacognitive Nation, 13 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 219, 228 (2009).
87.
Helmut Leder, Next Steps in Neuroaesthetics: Which Processes and Processing Stages to
Study?, 7 J. PSYCH. AESTHETICS, CREATIVITY & ARTS 27, 33 (2013).
88.
Valorie N. Salimpoor, David H. Zald, Robert J. Zatorre, Alain Dagher & Anthony Randal
McIntosh, Predictions and the Brain: How Musical Sounds Become Rewarding, 19 TRENDS COGNITIVE
SCI. 86, 89 (2015); see also KEVIN J. MITCHELL, INNATE: HOW THE WIRING OF OUR BRAINS SHAPES
WHO WE ARE 142–43 (2018) (discussing differences in perceptual abilities in the general population,
including the three percent of the population that is tone deaf).
89.
Johan De Smedt & Helen De Cruz, Toward an Integrative Approach of Cognitive
Neuroscientific and Evolutionary Psychological Studies of Art, 8 EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 695, 696
(2010).
90.
This comfort has consequences. In contrast to other kinds of copyright disputes, no plaintiff
in a copyright infringement case involving a literary work has won at trial in the last twenty-five years.
Steven T. Lowe, Death of Copyright 3: The Awakening, 41 L.A. LAW. 28, 28, 30 n.9 (2018). By contrast,
the success rate is greater for copyright suits involving musical compositions where courts are more
accepting of expert testimony. See Regina Zernay, Comment, Casting the First Stone: The Future of
Music Copyright Law After Blurred Lines, Stay With Me, and Uptown Funk, 20 CHAPMAN L. REV. 177,
209–11 (2017) (describing use of experts in music copyright infringement cases as “not uncommon”
and recounting commentary attributing the jury verdict finding infringement in a lawsuit over the song
“Blurred Lines” to testimony from plaintiff’s expert musicologists).
91.
See Tushnet, supra note 3, at 684 (“Copyright is literal. It starts with the written word as its
model, then tries to fit everything else into the literary mode.”).
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depending on the kind of creative work presented. Abstract art prompts
more varied aesthetic reactions than representational art.92 Dance expertise
and architectural knowledge exhibit their own unique biologies.93 Perhaps
most significantly, our biological responses to visual works differ from our
responses to aural ones. 94 For example, there is evidence that listeners
perceive music in a dissective manner as they analyze various individual
features of a song rather than evaluating the song holistically. By contrast,
evaluation of other creative works involves a more gestalt-like analysis.95
This difference between the aesthetic processing of visual and aural works
has direct implications for music infringement cases. Often such cases
depend on a judge’s choice to believe that the relevant audience will either
consider a song in its entirety or focus its attention on a particular measure
in the work’s chorus.96
Some might question whether neuroscientific research, which, by
necessity, is conducted with small sample sizes, can offer generalizable
insights into audience reaction. The answer is that, in a variety of contexts,
small sample sizes for neuroscientific studies supply results that apply to
larger, legally relevant populations.97 Although there is variability, “studies
of aesthetic preference are reasonably consistent in their findings.”98 Instead
of being hopelessly different, aesthetic reactions in particular audiences
appear to have enough coherence that information about these reactions can
help inform the audience test. Neuroaesthetic studies provide probative
evidence of commonalities among various cohorts, including women,
92.
Edward A. Vessel, Natalia Maurer, Alexander H. Denker & G. Gabrielle Starr, Stronger
Shared Taste for Natural Aesthetic Domains Than for Artifacts of Human Culture, 179 COGNITION 121,
122 (2018).
93.
Beatriz Calvo-Merino, Shantel Ehrenberg, Delia Leung & Patrick Haggard, Experts See It
All: Configural Effects in Action Observation, 74 PSYCHOL. RES. 400 (2010); Kirk et al., supra note 85,
at 309.
94.
Jon O. Lauring, Visual Art, in AN INTRODUCTION TO NEUROAESTHETICS 115, 125 (Jon O.
Lauring ed. 2014) (visual beauty triggers activity in the caudate nucleus, but not musical beauty);
Cristina Rosazza, Qing Cai, Ludovico Minati, Yves Paulignan & Tatjana A. Nazir, Early Involvement
of Dorsal and Ventral Pathways in Visual Word Recognition: An ERP Study, 1272 BRAIN RES. 32, 32–
33 (2009) (maintaining that there is better understanding of the neural pathways underlying visual object
recognition than for recognition of spoken or written words).
95.
Isabel Corngold, Note, Copyright Infringement and the Science of Music Memory: Applying
Cognitive Psychology to the Substantial Similarity Test, 45 AIPLA Q.J. 319, 339–42 (2017); Paul J.
Locher, The Aesthetic Experience with Visual Art “At First Glance”, in INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE
PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE ONTOLOGY OF THE WORK OF ART: WHAT ARE ARTWORKS AND HOW DO
WE EXPERIENCE THEM 75, 75–77 (Peer F. Bundgaard & Frederik Stjernfelt eds., 2015).
96.
See, e.g., Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 851 (9th Cir. 2004).
97.
Emily B. Falk, Elliot T. Berkman & Matthew D. Lieberman, From Neural Responses to
Population Behavior: Neural Focus Group Predicts Population-Level Media Effects, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI.
439, 444 (2012) (explaining that “behavioral responses of entire populations whose brains are never
examined may be inferred from the brain activations of a small neural focus group”).
98.
García-Prieto et al., supra note 83, at 98.
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children, and individuals of a particular socioeconomic status.99
Moreover, in the context of copyright infringement, everyone in a target
audience need not evaluate an artwork in the same way for such evidence to
be probative. A finding of substantial similarity relies only on general
agreement about the audience’s aesthetic experience, not certitude about the
uniformity of that experience. 100 Neuroaesthetic research demonstrates
there are enough differences in aesthetic judgment to invalidate copyright
law’s one-size-fits-all approach to audience reaction while at the same time
offering evidence of commonalities within particularized audiences.
Once audience difference is taken seriously, some difficult line-drawing
may be necessary when it comes to determining who makes up the relevant
audience for a work. Mistakes might be made, resulting in either over- or
underinclusion. But even the occasional misstep in selecting an audience
represents an improvement over the status quo, where audience differences
are ignored entirely. As I suggest in Part III, courts should embrace the
neuroscientific understanding of audience variability by calibrating the
substantial similarity analysis to the intended audience for the plaintiff’s
work instead of assuming that any onlooker would process the creative work
at issue in the same fashion.101
In sum, neuroaesthetics challenges copyright’s assumption that most
audiences think alike. Recent findings reveal great variability in aesthetic
response, which has potential consequences for construction of the
substantial similarity analysis. Merely distinguishing between experts and
non-experts does not capture the full scope of audience heterogeneity.
Rather than being in general agreement, different audience members, even
if they are not experts, process artistic works in different ways. Moreover,
if the audience test is to be informed by current neuroscientific
understandings, the test will need to be able to adapt to different modalities
in creative expression. Neuroscience demonstrates that not all audiences are
the same and that the mechanics of aesthetic judgment differ across kinds
of art. Unfortunately, copyright law offers no guidance to a trier of fact
striving to understand audience difference. The substantial similarity
analysis vigorously resists outside evidence whether in the form of
99.
See generally Cazzato et al., supra note 78; Jason Chien, Dustin Albert, Lia O’Brien, Kaitlyn
Uckert & Laurence Steinberg, Peers Increase Adolescent Risk by Enhancing Activity in the Brain’s
Reward Circuitry, 14 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 1 (2011); Martha J. Farah, The Neuroscience of
Socioeconomic Status: Correlates, Causes, and Consequences, 96 NEURON 56 (2017).
100. Cf. Brian Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment in Law, 69 ALA. L. REV. 381, 454 (2017) (maintaining
that one can reject the argument that aesthetic preference is so relative that judges may never make
aesthetic decisions while still not requiring that “everyone converge on one single, universally agreedupon interpretation and evaluation of every artwork”).
101. See infra Part III.A.2.

2020]

COPYRIGHT AND THE BRAIN

545

testimony from an expert in the field or surveys of relevant audience
members.
II. UNDERSTANDING AESTHETICS
In 2009, Tashera Simmons came up with an idea for a reality show called
“Hip Hop Wives.”102 Simmons was married to the rapper DMX, but a string
of arrests and extra-marital affairs took their toll on the relationship, and the
pair ultimately divorced.103 Simmons envisioned a show about the trials and
tribulations of women, including herself, in relationships with hip hop
artists. She pitched the idea to the television network VH1. VH1 passed, but
two years later began airing a reality show called “Love & Hip Hop”
focused on the personal and professional lives of women in the hip hop
industry.104 The show grew into a major media franchise with over four
hundred episodes airing to generally high ratings.105
There were a number of similarities between the “Hip Hop Wives”
proposal and the first season of “Love & Hip Hop.” Both shows centered
on the troubled personal relationships of women attached in some form to
the hip hop industry. Both featured Chrissy Lampkin, partner of the hip hop
artist Jim Jones. Both shows were described as having a “fast” and “high
octane” pace. Nevertheless, a district court concluded that “no reasonable
jury could conclude that the two works are substantially similar.”106
Three years earlier, the same court needed to decide another copyright
infringement suit involving reality television. This time, the plaintiff
managed to convince the court that a jury could find the two works
substantially similar. The plaintiff proposed a reality show that pitted
celebrity contestants against one another in events designed to mimic the
training for Navy Seals. A producer affiliated with NBCUniversal
responded favorably to the plaintiff’s pitch, but then declined. Shortly
thereafter, NBC aired a show called “Stars Earn Stripes” that revolved
around celebrity contestants competing in skill-based competitions based on
military maneuvers. In the court’s view, both shows demonstrated a similar
theme and mood (“appreciation and respect for military personnel”) and
102. 8th Wonder Entm’t v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-01748-DDP-JCG, 2016 WL 6882832,
at *1–3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2016).
103. Charli Penn, Tashera Simmons: Why I’m Really Divorcing DMX, ESSENCE (June 12, 2012),
https://www.essence.com/news/tashera-simmons-why-im-really-done-with-dmx/ [https://perma.cc/M4
XY-L2FW].
104. 8th Wonder Entm’t, 2016 WL 6882832 at *1–3.
105. Love & Hip Hop, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Love_%26_Hip_Hop [https://pe
rma.cc/4SFW-4JX4].
106. 8th Wonder Entm’t, 2016 WL 6882831 at *7–8.

546

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 98:525

“uncannily similar” kinds of contestants (e.g., WWE professional wrestlers,
former Dancing with the Stars competitors).107 Unlike in the case of Ms.
Simmons, the court concluded that when “[v]iewing the protectable
elements of the works as a whole,” a reasonable trier of fact could determine
the two works to be substantially similar.108
Some critics blame Arnstein’s call to interpret infringement through
audience sensibilities for the inconsistent and unpredictable state of
copyright infringement doctrine. 109 As discussed in Part I, neuroscience
indicates that the audience test does a bad job of addressing variations in
audiences and their judgment of creative works. Yet even though Arnstein
identified who was relevant for determining infringement, the decision did
not specify what its audience test was supposed to measure. A judge or jury
examining two works for substantial similarity needs to know what level of
similarity should be considered “substantial.” Other decisions supplied this
information, instructing that the task for the trier of fact was to determine if
the “aesthetic appeal” of the defendant’s work is the “same” as the
plaintiff’s work.110 At the same time, “aesthetic appeal” is not a term with a
clear legal or philosophical definition.111 Maybe two reality shows featuring
celebrities enduring military training had the same aesthetic appeal whereas
programs showcasing the personal lives of women in hip hop did not, but it
is hard to know why. Somehow the moods and themes in the first case were
insufficiently similar but not in the second. The shared use of comparable
kinds of celebrity contestants was probative of aesthetic similarity for the
military reality show, but featuring the same cast member in both hip hop
shows—Chrissy Lampkin—was not. By tethering infringement to aesthetic
experience, copyright law makes the infringement analysis highly uncertain
and often inconsistent.112
This is not to say that there are no guideposts for determining a work’s
107. Dillon v. NBCUniversal Media, 2013 WL 3581938, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2013).
108. Id. at *7.
109. Balganesh, supra note 4, at 859 (tying lack of guidelines for infringement analysis to the
audience test’s “anti-intellectual (i.e., intuitive) nature”); Lemley, supra note 2, at 719 (stating that
Arnstein “has the analysis of proof exactly backwards”).
110. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
111. See Robert Kirk Walker & Ben Depoorter, Unavoidable Aesthetic Judgments in Copyright
Law: A Community of Practice Standard, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 374–76 (2015) (suggesting different
ways to approach aesthetic judgments, and advocating for rendering such judgments from the
perspective of a hypothetical “Community of Practice” that can inform courts as to “the aesthetic norms
and traditions that influenced the works”).
112. My point here is not that both cases should have had the same outcome. Strong arguments
can be made for why common elements in the “Hip Hop Wives” case were unprotectable ideas or already
in the public domain whereas the similarities in the “Stars Earn Stripes” case involved protectable
expression. These distinctions are not clear, however, nor is it clear how the courts should identify which
similarities map onto the aesthetic experience of the relevant audience.
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aesthetic appeal. Over the years, in attempting to define the parameters of
the aesthetic experience, courts have made certain assumptions. Aesthetic
experience is considered subjective and unmeasurable, making a
quantitative analysis impossible. Any effort to empirically determine the
features of copyrighted works that audiences would pay the most attention
to or that would rank highest in their aesthetic evaluations is doomed to fail
and therefore must be excluded from the substantial similarity analysis.
Moreover, the belief that responses to art occur rapidly makes judges
skeptical of lengthy deliberations over work similarities. As we will see,
neuroaesthetic studies challenge some of these assumptions about the
aesthetic experience, placing the foundation of substantial similarity on
unstable ground.
A. Moving from Empirical Investigation to Unquantifiable Intuition
Courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries posited certain
qualities to the aesthetic experience. They maintained that pleasure was at
the heart of aesthetic response and this response was unavoidably
subjective, preventing its discernment through objective criteria. They also
believed that one appreciates art spontaneously, not through lengthy
analysis. These assumptions, despite a complete lack of empirical support
at the time they were made, remain embedded in the law of substantial
similarity today.
1. Daly v. Palmer and the Turn to Aesthetic Experience
By stressing aesthetic concerns, the substantial similarity test leaves out
other potential commonalities that could inform the infringement analysis.
One might envision a substantial similarity test that asked the jury in the
Led Zeppelin case to tally up what matches and what does not in a measureby-measure analysis of the two musical works, perhaps with the court first
screening out those aspects of Randy Wolfe’s song that are not
copyrightable. 113 Instead, the jury was told to make a “subjective
comparison” of Led Zeppelin and Wolfe’s works and evaluate their “total
concept and feel,” thereby foreclosing this kind of defined, detailed
comparison of song similarities and differences. 114 A comparison of
aesthetic appeal means that raw similarity, by itself, is not enough to
113. See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 847–48 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that district court erred
in “basing its comparison of the two choruses at issue almost entirely on a measure-by-measure
comparison” for purposes of the Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic test for substantial similarity).
114. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated and rev’d in
part on other grounds, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
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establish infringement.115
Another potential route for the infringement analysis would be to analyze
the commercial effect of the defendant’s work on the plaintiff’s audience
instead of its aesthetic effect.116 If market harm was the sine qua non of
infringement, the substantial similarity test would look much different.117 If
proof that the defendant’s work serves as an economic substitute for the
plaintiff’s work was required to find infringement, Tashera Simmons’ case
might have hinged on an assessment of whether VH1’s “Love & Hip Hop”
empire hurt the potential market for “Hip Hop Wives.” Copyright law has
not chosen this path either. The audience test rejects direct consideration of
perceived similarities or financial harm, instead defining infringement on
the unknowable aesthetic sensibilities of the trier of fact.118
The critical precedent that eventually led to aesthetic appeal becoming
the sine qua non of infringement was Daly v. Palmer.119 That case, decided
seventy-five years before Arnstein, signaled a move from defining
infringement as bodily appropriation of copyrighted expression to
something broader and ineffable. Beginning with Daly, in the mid to late
nineteenth century, “[t]he infringement analysis slowly shifted from having
a strong focus on verbatim copying to encompassing increasingly remote
115. Raw similarity is relevant to the copying in fact analysis. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363–64 (1991) (holding that while copying as a factual matter was shown,
copying as a legal proposition had not been established because the copied information was merely raw
data that did not “owe its origin” to the plaintiff).
116. Charles E. Colman, Design and Deviance: Patent as Symbol, Rhetoric As Metric Part 2, 56
JURIMETRICS 1, 10 (2015).
117. See Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of
Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719, 732 (1987) (“Instead of using some objective
standards or criteria based on economic impact or quantity, courts [are] to determine infringement on an
unpredictable, impressionistic basis.”); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in
Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203, 251–55 (2012) (maintaining that the substantial similarity analysis is
structured so as to take into account non-utilitarian values).
118. Analysis of market harm has largely been outsourced to copyright’s fair use analysis.
According to the Supreme Court, a defendant making a successful fair use defense must show that his
copying “does not materially impair the marketability of the work which is copied.” Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 567 (1985). Rather than guessing at audience response,
courts determine market harm by examining evidence regarding purchasers of the plaintiff’s and
defendant’s works, concluding that market harm is unlikely when these two groups of purchasers do not
overlap. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708–09 (2d Cir. 2013). Although arguments about harm to
future markets for derivatives of the original are considered in fair use, courts evaluating the defense
reject such arguments when they are speculative or lack empirical grounding. See Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007). Admittedly, determining when a market might
exist in the future is inherently difficult and can potentially depend on the fair use determination itself.
See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929–31 (2d Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, the fair
use doctrine’s insistence that fair use only be determined based on the presence of “a workable market”
indicates a level of objective inquiry that is not present in the current substantial similarity analysis.
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1276 (11th Cir. 2014); see also infra Part III.A.2.
119. 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552).

2020]

COPYRIGHT AND THE BRAIN

549

levels of similarity.”120
Playwright Augustin Daly wrote a melodrama with a sensationalist scene
featuring a character tied to a railroad track by a villain; the character was
then rescued from a steaming locomotive by the play’s protagonist in the
nick of time. When a theatre owner staged another play with a similar
railroad scene, Daly sued for copyright infringement.121 A federal court in
New York found in Daly’s favor explaining:
it is a piracy, if the appropriated series of events, when represented
on the stage, although performed by new and different characters,
using different language, is recognized by the spectator, through any
of the senses to which the representation is addressed, as conveying
substantially the same impressions to, and exciting the same
emotions in, the mind, in the same sequence or order.122
For decades, courts had assessed whether infringement occurred by looking
to whether the actual language of the original work had been copied by the
defendant. For example, Harriett Beecher Stowe failed in her infringement
action against an unauthorized translator of her book Uncle Tom’s Cabin
because the German translation did not contain the exact same English
words as the original. 123 The Daly decision conceived of the copyright
interest more broadly, not as a right in the four corners of a tangible object,
but as a right to prevent others from recreating aspects of a copyrighted work
in a way that would prompt the same aesthetic experience. Daly began to
shift substantial similarity away from an empirical investigation of tangible
qualities to a question that relied on unquantifiable intuition to answer.
Daly’s vision of aesthetic experience did not lend itself to a rigorous
picking apart of works. By locating infringement in the registering of
“impressions” and “emotions,”124 Daly implied that substantial similarity
could not be determined on the basis of careful study or an exacting
breakdown of two works into their component parts. As one early twentieth
century court explained, because “copyright, like all statutes, is made for
plain people . . . infringement must be something which ordinary
observations would cause to be recognized”; if “dissection rather than
observation” is needed “to discern any resemblance,” then there is no

120. Bracha, supra note 41, at 171.
121. Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1133.
122. Id. at 1138.
123. Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 208 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) (“A translation may,
in loose phraseology, be called a transcript or copy of her thoughts or conceptions, but in no correct
sense can it be called a copy of her book.”).
124. Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1137.
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infringement. 125 More recently, a federal court of appeals described the
“touchstone of the [substantial similarity] analysis” as only countenancing
those differences that the ordinary observer had not “set out to detect.”126
To protect the impressionistic quality of aesthetic reaction, courts largely
prohibit attempts to determine substantial similarity by compiling lists of
similarities and differences in the works at issue.127 Determining aesthetic
response should not involve a “catalogue,” explained Learned Hand. Instead
the “proper approach . . . must be more ingenious, more like that of a
spectator, who would rely upon the complex of his impressions of each
character.”128 Courts today describe the infringement comparison as one of
“overall look and feel.” 129 Thanks to the focus on aesthetic response,
“copyright infringement is supposed to be based on a gestalt reaction,”130
not an evaluation of “minute differences between the two works.”131
2. Pleasure and the Inherent Subjectivity of Aesthetic Experience
In attempting to formulate the central components of aesthetic
experience, courts highlight audience pleasure. Copyright decisions speak
of a certain substance in creative works that is pleasurable to the senses and
can be elucidated without much effort. In a formulation endorsed by several
federal courts, Arnstein framed the substantial similarity analysis as
“whether defendant took from plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing
to the ears of lay listeners . . . that defendant wrongfully appropriated
something which belongs to the plaintiff.”132 Courts can equate that which
is “pleasing” in the aesthetic experience with beauty, explaining that it is
the “beautiful” aspects of a work that must be protected from appropriation
by others.133 Put another way, the trier of fact must assess what the audience
125. Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924)).
126. Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
127. 3 PATRY, supra note 67, at § 9.76; see, e.g., Olson v. Tenney, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1235
(D. Or. 2006) (expressing skepticism over probative value of plaintiff’s compilation of 185 supposed
similarities between her work and the defendant’s).
128. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930).
129. Sturdza, 281 F.3d at 1296; Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (“total concept and feel”); DuBay v. King, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1330,
1348 (M.D. Fla. 2019).
130. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 736.
131. Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 1982); see
also Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484, 489 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e analyze works as cohesive wholes,
without distinguishing between protected and unprotected elements, just as the works’ intended
audiences likely would encounter them in the marketplace.”).
132. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946); see also, e.g., Sturdza, 281 F.3d at 1296.
133. E.g., King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 536 (2d Cir. 1924) (“The concept of
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would consider of value in the plaintiff’s work and determine if that
pleasurable essence is replicated in the defendant’s work.134 This linking of
audience pleasure and aesthetic response takes what might be a logical
inquiry regarding the tangible material of the plaintiff’s work and
transforms it into a query that is subjective and resistant to judicial scrutiny.
For copyright law, the pleasure enjoyed by audiences is inevitably
subjective and intuitive. Take these comments from the Ninth Circuit on
how the trier of fact should put herself in the shoes of the average audience
member. Substantial similarity, the court explained:
is not a legal conclusion; rather it involves the audience in an
interactive process with the author of the work in question, and calls
on us “to transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a
semblance of truth sufficient to procure for those shadows of
imagination that willing suspension of belief for the moment, which
constitutes poetic faith.”135
This “interactive process” between author and audience is unavoidably
subjective, requiring courts to abandon their penchant for objective
analysis.136 The panel went on to employ a quote from Hamlet to describe
this process, stating that “this interactive assessment is by nature an
individualized one that will provoke a varied response in each juror, for
what ‘makes the unskillful laugh, cannot but make the judicious grieve.’”137
In other words, the pleasure experienced by audiences cannot be derived
through objective calculation. It must be subjectively experienced by the
beauty expressed in the materials of statuary or drawing, is the thing which is copyrighted. That is what
the infringer copies.”). One might worry that linking the aesthetic experience to beauty would overly
limit the range of copyrightable materials, with courts reserving protection for only works that fall into
preconceived categories of classical or fine art. But “beauty” has been defined broadly. See Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954) (“Individual perception of the beautiful is too varied a power to permit
a narrow or rigid concept of art.”). Moreover, although perhaps challenged by relatively recent trends in
contemporary art, there is widespread agreement that beauty and pleasure are essential components in
the aesthetic experience. CHATTERJEE, supra note 19, at xx–xxi. One study showed that “beauty” was
the word most commonly associated with aesthetics. Thomas Jacobsen, Katharina Buchta, Michael
Köhler & Erich Schröger, The Primacy of Beauty in Judging the Aesthetics of Objects, 94 PSYCH. REP.
1253, 1253–60 (2004).
134. The Tenth Circuit defines substantial similarity as “whether the accused work is so similar
to the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully
appropriated the plaintiff’s protectible [sic] expression by taking material of substance and value.”
Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 1996). Courts applying this
“substance and value” standard have equated it with “aesthetic appeal.” Blehm v. Jacobs, 702 F.3d 1193,
1202 (10th Cir. 2012).
135. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting S.T. Coleridge, Biographia
Literaria, ch. 14, reprinted in 5 ENGLISH LITERATURE: THE ROMANTIC PERIOD (A. Reed ed., 1929)),
overruled on other grounds by Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
136. See id.
137. Id. (citing WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc. 2).
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trier of fact in the way that the audience itself experienced it or would
experience it.138
Hence, courts rely on “intuitive sense” to assess a work’s aesthetic
appeal rather than reasoned evaluation or guidance from experts in the
field.139 Zahr Said describes copyright’s conception of aesthetic reading as
“subjective in the nonlegal sense of intuitive, impressionistic[,] and gestalt
as opposed to analytic and dissective.” 140 Instinct is what matters for
measuring aesthetic response, not reasoned deliberation. Dissenting in
Arnstein, Judge Clark contended that “[m]usic is a matter of the intellect as
well as the emotions; that is why eminent musical scholars insist upon the
employment of the intellectual faculties for a just appreciation of music.”141
Yet the majority took a different path, now followed by all other federal
courts, that asks for the immediate reactions of the trier of fact, unaided by
scholarly expertise, to diagnose the actionable essence of creative works.142
The downside to characterizing aesthetic response as inherently
subjective is that it makes that response impossible to pin down, leaving
copyright litigants on uncertain terrain and the trier of fact reliant on instinct
to decide the ultimate issue of infringement. Courts acknowledge this
demerit without really coming up with any workable corrective. Responding
to criticism that its test for substantial similarity was too vague, the Second
Circuit somewhat feebly responded that the trier of fact must “identify
precisely the particular aesthetic decisions—original to the plaintiff and
copied by the defendant—that might be thought to make the designs similar
in the aggregate.”143 Yet the court offered no guidance for determining how
to make this precise identification of what the audience might think similar.
Outsiders cannot help with this identification. Because aesthetic judgment
is an intuitive process not a deliberative one, the trier of fact must rely on
138. A good example comes from Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484 (4th Cir. 2015) where the
court tried to recreate how “the general public typically encounters popular music” by listening to the
songs at issue “from start to finish” as “lay listeners,” but seemingly not repeating them over and over.
Id. at 491–92.
139. Walker & Depoorter, supra note 111, at 374.
140. Zahr K. Said, A Transactional Theory of the Reader in Copyright Law, 102 IOWA L. REV.
605, 619 (2017).
141. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 476 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting).
142. Even after the decision, Judge Clark continued to think that Arnstein’s privileging of
“average” aesthetics over objective expertise was wrongheaded:
[T]he issue is no longer one of musical similarity or identity to justify the conclusion of
copying—a[n] issue to be decided with all the intelligence, musical as well as legal we can
bring to bear upon it—but is one, first, of copying, to be decided more or less intelligently, and,
second, of illicit copying, to be decided blindly on a mere cacophony of sounds.
Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 491 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment).
143. Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir.
2003) (emphasis added).
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her sensibilities alone and “detect piracy ‘without any aid or suggestions or
critical analysis by others.’”144
An important Ninth Circuit decision, Shaw v. Lindheim, 145 openly
recognizes the predictive difficulties spawned by copyright law’s focus on
aesthetic reaction. Shaw affirmed that substantial similarity in that
jurisdiction requires satisfaction of both an “extrinsic test” and an “intrinsic
test.” The extrinsic test allows an analysis of similarities according to
objective criteria and a filtering out of unprotectable elements. If the
plaintiff satisfies the extrinsic test, the trier of fact must then evaluate
infringement under the intrinsic test. The intrinsic test, far different from the
extrinsic test, is based on the “total concept and feel” of the work to “the
ordinary, reasonable person.” 146 It allows the unprotectable elements
filtered out during the extrinsic analysis to flood back in for comparison. It
is also extremely vague, making it exceedingly difficult for courts to
evaluate and overturn problematic infringement rulings.147 The Shaw court
acknowledged that “a judicial determination under the intrinsic test is now
virtually devoid of analysis, for the intrinsic test has become a mere
subjective judgment as to whether two literary works are or are not
similar.”148 It went on to note that courts often supply no more than a single
paragraph of analysis to justify their determination under the intrinsic
similarity determination.149
These may sound like criticisms, but the Shaw court did not call for
changing the intrinsic test. It was comfortable, or at least accepting, of the
test’s unanalytic, unreviewable conception of aesthetic response. Shaw only
requires that the intrinsic analysis be conducted by the trier of fact, making
summary judgment impossible once the defendant clears the hurdle of the
144. Peel & Co. v. Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Harold
Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir. 1933)).
145. 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Skidmore v. Led
Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020).
146. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1119 (9th Cir. 2018). The Ninth Circuit’s intrinsic test has
been described as operating in the same fashion and serving the same purpose as the traditional ordinary
observer test. Said, supra note 140, at 611.
147. Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1830–32 (contending that, by making the defendant’s capture
of the “total concept and feel” of the plaintiff’s work the core inquiry of the intrinsic test, courts have
made “it too easy for unprotectable elements to be swept into the infringement analysis”).
148. Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357 (citing Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985) and
Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988)). Judicial insistence that the audience’s
experience with the works at issue is subjective and therefore undefinable may be viewed not just as a
belief about the reality of art appreciation, but also a ploy to avoid decisionmaking in this area. Christine
Haight Farley traces a pervasive judicial reluctance to engage with aesthetic questions in the law
generally. “Art is assumed to be the quintessence of the subjective,” says Farley, and “[s]ubjectivity
makes judges uncomfortable.” Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 856 (2005).
149. See Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988) (reaching a result under
the intrinsic test in one paragraph); Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985) (same).
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extrinsic test.150
3. Time
Another component of aesthetic appeal involves its temporal scope.
Courts have suggested a time limit for judges and juries attempting to
discern the aesthetic response of ordinary observers and listeners. The
probable response by the ordinary observer after labored scrutiny of the
works at issue is not what the analysis asks for. Instead, the analysis asks
for only the “spontaneous and immediate” experience of audiences.151 The
“visceral reactions” of the observer are what determine infringement. 152
Courts sometimes refer to the “ordinary observer” as the “casual observer,”
implying that a speedy, non-deliberative processing of the works at issue is
the appropriate means for calculating substantial similarity.153
As a result, rapid responses to creative works have more validity for the
infringement analysis than ones drawn out over time. Aesthetic experience
should be immediate: “There is a notion that juries ought to be able to look
at works and experience a gut reaction.” 154 Unless the work at issue is
particularly complex or technical, the work is “seen to speak for itself,”
obviating the need for lengthy scrutiny.155 Even comparisons that may be
relatively challenging because the plaintiff’s work and the defendant’s work
are in different media are evaluated for their instantaneous impression. For
example, a court assessing whether a book and a movie were substantially
similar explained that it compared the two works “to determine a lay
observer’s immediate response.” 156 In this view, the rapidity of aesthetic
judgment makes it more reliable in diagnosing improper copying, not less.
This call for immediate impressions rather than careful comparison
vexes some opponents of the ordinary observer test. “Why should the
ordinary observer be expected to detect spontaneously and immediately the
theft which probably took weeks and months to disguise?,” queried one

150. Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1361.
151. Peel & Co. v. Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harold Lloyd Corp. v.
Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir. 1933)). See also Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 51 (2d
Cir. 1986) (noting that the Second Circuit generally judges substantial similarity “by the spontaneous
response of the ordinary lay observer”).
152. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, at §13.03[E][2].
153. E.g., United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
154. Said, supra note 140, at 639.
155. Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright Interpretation, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 502 n.232
(2015).
156. Randolph v. Dimension Films, 634 F. Supp. 2d 779, 792 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (emphasis added).
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exasperated law professor. 157 The answer is that substantial similarity
investigates aesthetic encounters, which courts believe to be instantaneous
phenomena. Many other areas of the law require the trier of fact to intuit the
behavior of outsiders. Tort law famously asks whether the defendant’s
conduct matches the conduct of the “reasonable person.” Yet, because
copyright law asks the trier of fact to intuit the reasonable person’s aesthetic
response, courts stress that there is no time for the reasonable person to
engage in lengthy deliberation or analysis.
By defining aesthetic response as something immediate, courts supply
another reason—in addition to the assumption that aesthetic responses are
universal—to exclude experts from the substantial similarity analysis. 158
Expertise would seem to have little place in describing a phenomenon that
operates so instinctually. At times, courts explicitly bifurcate the nonaesthetic properties of a creative work, which they believe can benefit from
articulation by an expert, from its aesthetic properties, which they believe
cannot. Expert testimony is allowed in copyright cases involving computer
software because software typically reflects more of an emphasis on
functional properties than aesthetic ones. 159 By contrast, there is a
“traditional role of lay observers in judging substantial similarity in
copyright cases that involve the aesthetic arts, such as music, visual works
or literature.”160 In one case, a court diagnosed “structural” similarities and
“aesthetic” similarities in two gazebos.161 Expert testimony was not allowed
regarding the gazebos’ aesthetic elements, but “because structural and
engineering elements are not necessarily within the jury’s knowledge,
expert testimony as to these matters may assist the jury.”162 According to
the law of copyright infringement, non-aesthetic components of creative
works are susceptible to reasoned deliberation; aesthetic components are
not.

157. Robert Fuller Fleming, Substantial Similarity: Where Plots Really Thicken, 19 COPYRIGHT
L. SYMP. 252, 275 (1969). See also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, at § 13.03[E][2] (“There are
reasons why the spontaneous impressions of an ordinary observer—or reasonable person in comparing
two literary works—may not always prove an accurate guide to ferreting out the existence of literary
theft.”).
158. See Balganesh et al., supra note 34, at 274 (describing the relevant audience reaction as one
that is “spontaneous and immediate” which “adds a further air of subjectivity and apparent impulsiveness
to the similarity comparison”).
159. See Joseph P. Fishman & Deepa Varadarajan, Similar Secrets, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1075
(2019).
160. Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713–14 (2d Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).
161. W.H. Porter, Inc. v. Kline Multiproducts, Inc., No. 1:00-CV-371, 2001 WL 35741246, at *1
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 2001).
162. Id.
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B. The Science of How Aesthetic Decisions Are Made
Neuroscientists are becoming more and more adept at quantifying
different components of aesthetic judgment, a mental process that copyright
law insists is impossible to measure. By no means do these neural
recordings reflect a complete or invariably accurate picture of our
experiences with creative works. But they do offer empirical information
for a process that legal actors have long complained was in need of just such
information. At the same time, brain research confirms the courts’ temporal
assessment of aesthetic experience. Our reactions to creative works occur
automatically and are rarely shaken from this initial estimate.
1. Searching for Objective Measures
As neuroaesthetic studies continue to reveal more specifics about
aesthetic choice, copyright law’s longstanding insistence that aesthetic
choice cannot be interrogated may weaken. Researchers claim to be able to
distinguish the hallmarks of aesthetic experience from functional
experiences.163 Neuroscientists identify a “fundamentally different pattern
of neurophysiological activation” for artworks audience members perceive
as “best in terms of aesthetic quality” 164 or “the most aesthetically
moving.” 165 Scientists are also getting better at separating aesthetic
judgment into its component parts. The neural evidence of an audience’s
processing of an artwork’s pictorial content can be distinguished from
evidence of the audience’s processing of the artist’s style.166
Neuroscientific study of human reactions to music provides a good
example of how brain science can contribute to our understanding of
aesthetic encounters. “Aesthetic listening” experiments purport to offer a
“traceable” mental process for the perception, understanding, and
enjoyment of musical events.167 These experiments reveal the significance
of particular portions of musical works to the listener. Tell-tale neural
163. Lauring, supra note 94, at 148; Edward A. Vessel, G. Gabrielle Starr & Nava Rubin, The
Brain on Art: Intense Aesthetic Experience Activates the Default Mode Network, 6 FRONTIERS HUMAN
NEUROSCI. 1, 9 (2012).
164. García-Prieto et al., supra note 83, at 100; see G. GABRIELLE STARR, FEELING BEAUTY: THE
NEUROSCIENCE OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 59–63 (2013).
165. Vessel et al., supra note 163, at 9.
166. M. Dorothee Augustin, Birgit Defranceschi, Helene K. Fuchs, Claus-Christian Carbon &
Florian Hutzler, The Neural Time Course of Art Perception: An ERP Study on the Processing of Style
Versus Content in Art, 49 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 2071, 2072 (2011); García-Prieto et al., supra note 83,
at 95.
167. Reybrouck, supra note 15, at 10 (reviewing neuroimaging studies involving music and
concluding that “where the individual perceives, understands, enjoys and evaluates a musical event is
traceable in terms of network connectivity and activations of target regions of the brain”).
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signals distinguish between sounds serving as a real stimulus that can
contribute to the aesthetic experience from sounds that the listener will only
consider noise.168
Perhaps most relevant to the substantial similarity calculation,
neuroaesthetics investigates which aspects of artistic work are most salient
to audiences. 169 Understandably, substantial similarity doctrine asks the
trier of fact to render a judgment as to aesthetic salience. For example, when
an R&B songwriter accused Usher and Justin Bieber of wrongfully
appropriating his musical work, the Fourth Circuit reversed a substantial
similarity determination in the defendants’ favor.170 It faulted the trial court
for ignoring the importance of the choruses to both songs and applying a
“purely quantitative inquiry” to the question of “aesthetic appeal.” 171
Because choruses are the part of a song “that many listeners will recognize
immediately or hear in their minds when a song title is mentioned,” the
appellate judges deemed chorus similarities “disproportionately
significant.”172
This makes sense. If one is concerned with protecting the creative
incentives of authors, it is appropriate to use copyright law to protect the
original aspects of a work that are most noticeable or important to audiences.
The problem is that the Fourth Circuit relied on a hunch about audience
reaction to the songs’ choruses, not any objective information about how
the choruses were actually perceived. In the past, this kind of information
about aesthetic salience was largely unknowable; hunches were all judges
could go on. Today, imaging technologies offer an empiric and finergrained portrait of aesthetic choice.173
Aesthetic salience can be diagnosed in a variety of ways. Neuroaesthetic
researchers often equate such salience with pleasure. 174 As the cognitive
psychologist Steven Pinker writes, art’s primary function is to “press our
pleasure buttons.”175 Pleasure facilitates the brain’s attentional networks as
168. PAUL B. ARMSTRONG, HOW LITERATURE PLAYS WITH THE BRAIN: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF
READING AND ART 14, 45 (2013).
169. See infra notes 173–185 and accompanying text.
170. Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484 (4th Cir. 2015).
171. Id. at 493–95.
172. Id. at 494 (citation omitted).
173. E.g., Valorie N. Salimpoor, Iris van den Bosch, Natasa Kovacevic, Anthony Randal
McIntosh, Alain Dagher & Robert J. Zatorre, Interactions Between the Nucleus Accumbens and Auditory
Cortices Predict Music Reward Value, 340 SCIENCE 216, 217 (2013) (revealing greater connectivity
between particular brain regions when listeners experience unfamiliar music that they find pleasurable
and desirable).
174. CHATTERJEE, supra note 19, at 111–12 (discussing relationship between pleasure and
aesthetic experience); STARR, supra note 164, at 7 (“[A]ll aesthetic experiences involve pleasure or
displeasure and some degree of emotional response.”).
175. STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 524–25 (1997).
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pleasurable sensations prompt a reallocation of cognitive resources for
enhanced processing of a stimulus.176
A related subject of neuroaesthetic research is how audiences recognize
beauty—a logical avenue of inquiry given beauty’s role in the popular
imagination as the primary criterion for making aesthetic judgments.177 One
might question the ability to interrogate something as seemingly amorphous
as beauty. We have all heard the saying that beauty is in the eye of the
beholder. But scientists searching for the biological signs of perceived
beauty contend that the “neural activity seems to be detectable and
quantifiable, which makes it apt for empirical investigation.”178 Cultural
differences exist, but there is also a shared, unconscious sense of what is
attractive.179
Some work finds that the experience of beauty has its own unique neural
signature. Scientists have identified “a single faculty of beauty into which
different senses feed.”180 When audience members are asked to rate stimuli
as either “ugly,” “indifferent,” or “beautiful,” the stimuli designated as
“beautiful” generate particular brain behaviors. Multiple experiments
correlate the experience of beauty with activity in a particular area of the
brain: the medial orbit-frontal cortex or mOFC. 181 Other studies
demonstrate links between patterns of neural activity across the brain and
the experiences of aesthetic contemplation and pleasure.182
It is not just that brain-imaging tools offer a clue as to when an observer
or listener will consider something to be beautiful. Neuroaesthicians are
more ambitious, leveraging their current understandings to develop ways to
calculate the strength of an aesthetic response. In one highly publicized
study, participants listened to unfamiliar fragments of music and were
allocated a fixed sum that they used to “vote” on which fragments they
would like to listen to again. The degree of neural activity in particular brain
176. García-Prieto et al., supra note 83, at 98.
177. See Donald A. Hodges, The Neuroaesthetics of Music, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
MUSIC PSYCHOLOGY 247, 248 (2016).
178. Reybrouck, supra note 15, at 3.
179. See THOMAS HILGERS, AESTHETIC DISINTERESTEDNESS: ART, EXPERIENCE, AND THE SELF
17 (2017); ERIC R. KANDEL, THE AGE OF INSIGHT 379 (2012).
180. Tomohiro Ishizu & Semir Zeki, Toward a Brain-Based Theory of Beauty, 6 PLOS ONE 1, 1
(2011).
181. de Smedt, supra note 89, at 701; García-Prieto et al., supra note 83, at 92; see also
Reybrouck, supra note 15, at 9 (stating that neuroscience has “the potential to inform our knowledge
about how the brain responds to music and decides if a musical piece is considered beautiful or not”).
182. Edward A. Vessel, G. Gabrielle Starr & Nava Rubin, Art Reaches Within: Aesthetic
Experience, the Self and the Default Mode Network, 7 FRONTIERS HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE 1, 1–2
(2013); Robin W. Wilkins, D.A. Hodges, P. J. Laurenti, M. Steen & J.H. Burdette, Network Science and
the Effects of Music Preference on Functional Brain Connectivity: From Beethoven to Eminem, 4 SCI.
REP. 6130, at 4 (2014).
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regions predicted the amount of money participants were willing to pay to
listen to their preferred fragments a second or third time. The activated brain
regions had been ascertained from previous research to be integral to
“emotional processing and value-guided decision-making.” 183 Copyright
law assumes that our intuitive reactions to art cannot be measured, but,
according to the study’s authors, their findings reveal “a mechanism for
valuation of stimuli with abstract importance.”184 Neuroscientists envision
a near future where they can calculate the depth of an audience’s aesthetic
reactions. As two leaders in the field contend, “the subjective experience of
beauty and of ugliness can be objectively ascertained and measured” and
will “take aesthetics very much into the subjective, though quantifiable,
arena.”185
Admittedly, there is more to aesthetic processing than experiencing
beauty and pleasure. Both cognitive psychologists and philosophers agree
that dislike, disgust, and other aesthetic emotions are important as well.186
But the subjective experience of beauty is directly linked to the sensation of
pleasure, something that is assuredly at the heart of aesthetic judgment.187
In general, there is a significant overlap between the basic hedonic pleasures
we experience through activities like sex and eating and the higher-order
pleasures we associate with aesthetic experience.188 Consciously or not, we
find these experiences rewarding and fMRI and EEG technologies have the
ability to reveal when the mind’s reward center has been activated from such
experiences.189
As noted, in seeming agreement with neuroaesthetic research, courts
articulating the audience test speak of “beauty” and “pleasure,” encouraging
183. Salimpoor et al., supra note 173, at 218.
184. Id.
185. Ishizu & Zeki, supra note 180, at 8–9.
186. Steven Brown, Xiaoqing Gao, Loren Tisdelle, Simon B. Eickhoff & Mario Liotti,
Naturalizing Aesthetics: Brain Areas for Aesthetic Appraisal Across Sensory Modalities, 58
NEUROIMAGE 250, 251 (2011); Pearce et al., supra note 15, at 268; see also Camilo J. Cela-Conde,
Luigi Agnati, Joseph P. Huston, Francisco Mora & Marcos Nadal, The Neural Foundations of Aesthetic
Appreciation, 94 PROGRESS NEUROBIOLOGY 39, 41 (2011) (noting that “ugly” objects can still be
considered great works of art).
187. Amy M. Belfi, Edward A. Vessel, Aenee Brielmann, Ayse Ilkay Isik, Anjan Chatterjee,
Helmut Leder, Denis G. Pelli & G. Gabrielle Starr, Dynamics of Aesthetic Experience Are Reflected in
the Default-Mode Network, 188 NEUROIMAGE 584, 593 (2019); Cela-Conde et al., supra note 186, at
42 (listing multiple studies demonstrating that “beauty ratings capture the aesthetic experience in a more
meaningful way” than other ratings like originality or interest).
188. Reybrouck, supra note 15, at 8; Arthur P. Shimamura, Toward a Science of Aesthetics, in
AESTHETIC SCIENCE 3, 4 (Arthur P. Shimamura & Stephen E. Palmer eds., 2014) (referring to aesthetics
as “any ‘hedonic’ response to a sensory experience”).
189. Mona Lisa Chanda & Daniel J. Levitin, The Neurochemistry of Music, 17 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 179, 181 (2013) (employing fMRI imaging to reveal “neural correlates of musical
pleasure”); de Smedt, supra note 89, at 701.
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the trier of fact to examine their subjective experience of the works at issue
for those qualities and feelings. 190 Those same courts may be unwilling,
however, to equate aesthetic reward with the reward from stroking a
romantic partner’s hair or eating a mouth-watering cheeseburger. 191
Fortunately, neuroscience offers the potential for separating the sensory
rewards of art from other experiences. As Gabrielle Starr writes in her
investigation of the aesthetic experience of beauty, “[t]he finding that
reward activations for painting straddle both the dorsal ventral regions of
the striatum begins to support the possibility . . . that aesthetic rewards may
be processed differently.”192 Starr goes on to note that research shows not
only a particularity in how aesthetic rewards are processed in the brain but
also in how those rewards are integrated. Aesthetic experience, like other
pleasurable experiences, integrates reward signals to engage emotional
processes. But this engagement involves a particularly large, integrated
system in the brain—the default mode network—that is not necessarily
activated in response to other sensory rewards.193 The default mode network
is associated with introspection and self-assessment, making it a likely locus
of activity for aesthetic judgment.194
In a related vein, there is a measurable biological difference between the
reward received from a stimulus someone “likes” and the reward received
from a stimulus someone “wants.”195 It is hypothesized that liking—what
the neuroscientist Anjan Chatterjee describes as “pleasure without an
acquisitive impulse”196—is what it means to experience aesthetic pleasure.
We can enjoy a painting without thinking we need to take it home. One
neuroscientist contends that “the central question regarding the rewarding
dimension of aesthetic experience is to shed light on the difference between
‘liking’ and ‘wanting’ processes.”197 If the aesthetic pleasure at issue in the
190. See supra Part II.A.2.
191. See Christopher Buccafusco, Making Sense of Intellectual Property Law, 97 CORNELL L.
REV. 501, 511 (2012) (critiquing copyright law’s privileging of the senses of vision and hearing while
discounting the aesthetic experience generated by the senses of touch and taste).
192. STARR, supra note 164, at 51.
193. Id. at 51–56.
194. García-Prieto et al., supra note 83, at 99–100.
195. Kent C. Berridge, Terry E. Robinson & J. Wayne Aldridge, Dissecting Components of
Reward: “Liking,” “Wanting,” and Learning, 9 CURRENT OPINION PHARMACOLOGY 65, 65–68 (2009);
Louise P. Kirsch, Cosimo Urgesi & Emily S. Cross, Shaping and Reshaping the Aesthetic Brain:
Emerging Perspectives on the Neurobiology of Embodied Aesthetics, 62 NEUROSCIENCE &
BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 56, 65 (2016).
196. CHATTERJEE, supra note 19, at xx.
197. García-Prieto et al., supra note 83, at 94. This maps onto a central component of aesthetic
theory—the idea that aesthetic judgment requires disinterested appreciation, i.e., enjoying art for its own
sake and not as a means for serving our own interests. See Alexandra King, The Aesthetic Attitude,
INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (2019), https://www.iep.utm.edu/aesth-at/ [https://perma.cc/8HDZ-AC
BN].
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audience test is the pleasure from liked but not wanted rewards, then perhaps
an ability to determine when the neural signature for liking has been
triggered upon experiencing a particular creative work could be relevant to
substantial similarity.198
It is important to state here that neuroscience is not yet at the point where
such measurements are reliable or specific enough to determine the
substantial similarity analysis. The overlap between aesthetic pleasure and
other sensory pleasures can be difficult to disentangle as is the difference
between “liking” rewards and “wanting” rewards. Nevertheless, the
possibility of a future where aesthetic judgment lends itself to quantification
deserves serious consideration. A roadmap to the particular aspects of
creative works that produce the greatest devotion of attentional resources
and prompt the most pleasurable sensations in their audiences would seem
to be just what the substantial similarity analysis cries out for. Instead of
guessing at the salience of a particular musical passage, the trier of fact
could be provided with neural proof of that passage’s salience. Some
tangible evidence of aesthetic response, even if incomplete, might be better
than the current legal black box for understanding audiences.
Admittedly, at this point, neuroscience can only offer a very partial
picture of aesthetic reaction; it can only serve as a supplement to, not a
substitute for, the current substantial similarity inquiry. As the author of one
copyright treatise writes regarding the use of psychological research more
broadly, “[t]hese inquiries would not supplant the ordinary observer test,
but instead assist in understanding how much weight the ordinary observer
should give to similarities and differences.”199 Neural imaging is not a cureall, but it would be an improvement over the status quo if a court could make
a more informed decision as to the aesthetic relevance of a particular
musical passage instead of relying on complete guesswork (as in the case
involving Usher and Justin Bieber).200
Most importantly, even if brain imaging is unlikely to be accepted as
evidence in individual copyright cases in the short term, neuroaesthetic
research will force courts to abandon the current assumption that any
objective analysis of aesthetic response is impossible. The audience test
198. Although liking and wanting usually overlap, they do not always. An illustrative example
comes from the stimulation of different areas of the ventral stratum region of the brain, one area devoted
to liking and one to wanting. Stimulating the liking area will not cause an animal to eat more but it will
make the animal enjoy eating more, as evidenced by increased lip-smacking behavior, a hedonic reaction
found in both lab rats and human infants. Stimulating the wanting area will cause the animal to work
harder to obtain food but without impacting its hedonic reactions upon eating the food. Kent C. Berridge
& Morten L. Kringelbach, Neuroscience of Affect: Brain Mechanisms of Pleasure and Displeasure, 23
CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY 294, 298–99 (2013).
199. 3 PATRY, supra note 67, at § 9:85.
200. See supra notes 160–161.
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operates under the belief that our aesthetic experiences cannot be measured.
As a result, substantial similarity decisions are not specified by the trier of
fact or interrogated by courts in review. This, in turn, makes it extremely
difficult to dispose of the issue of substantial similarity before trial.
Copyright law exhorts triers of fact to examine their experiences of “beauty”
and “pleasure” in deciding infringement claims yet offers little to no
guidance for what those legally relevant sensory categories should mean.
Even if neuroaesthetics cannot yet fully break down our experiences of
aesthetic pleasure and beauty, it calls into question copyright law’s refusal
to countenance any objective analysis of how we respond to creative works.
2. Immediacy
As discussed, the audience test assumes that aesthetic judgment is both
rapid and stable. 201 This assumption has consequences for the copyright
infringement analysis. It is the lay observer’s “immediate response” and
“spontaneous reaction” that is relevant to identifying the protectable essence
of the copyrighted work. Any longer appreciation of the work is considered
illegitimate, either because courts assume that any later evaluation of the
work will alter the original judgment or because the audience’s instant
experience is deemed a better proxy for the market behavior of interested
patrons. Dissection is discouraged because such an analytical approach
seems unlikely to improve outcomes if the goal is to recreate the actual
speed at which audiences evaluate creative expression.
Neuroscientists investigate the temporal dynamics of aesthetic judgment,
something that has only been guessed at by the federal courts. 202 Their
research has coalesced around a two-phase description of the timing
involved in aesthetic appreciation. 203 First, there is an initial implicit
processing phase that captures “low-level” features of the perceived object.
Second, there is a higher-level processing phase involving “a deeper
aesthetic evaluation.”204
The critical thing to note here is that both phases take place rapidly. The
first low-level phase occurs 300–400 milliseconds after presentation of a
201. See supra Part II.A.3.
202. EEG measurements, which can track brain activity at a much faster rate than fMRI analysis,
have been critical here. Helmut Leder & Marcos Nadal, Ten Years of a Model of Aesthetic Appreciation
and Aesthetic Judgments: The Aesthetic Episode – Developments and Challenges in Empirical
Aesthetics, 105 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 443, 448 (2014) (“Electrophysiological techniques are ideally suited to
examine the time course of the neural correlates of mental processes.”).
203. Camilo J. Cela-Conde, Juan García-Prieto, José J. Ramasco, Claudio R. Mirasso, Ricardo
Bajo, Enric Munar, Albert Flexas, Francisco del-Pozo & Fernando Maestú, Dynamics of Brain Networks
in Aesthetic Appreciation, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 10,454, 10,455 (2013).
204. García-Prieto et al., supra note 83, at 95.
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stimulus. The second phase takes place almost immediately thereafter, 600
milliseconds after stimulus presentation.205 Much happens in this short time
frame. An observer’s brain can process the content in an artwork in 10
milliseconds and the artwork’s style in 50 milliseconds.206
This research shows that aesthetic judgment occurs instantaneously, in a
similar fashion to the “spontaneous reaction” described by the courts.207
Strong preferences form in this short window as the brain conducts both
sensory and semantic analyses of the stimulus at issue. 208 Judgment of a
creative work’s beauty occurs in a split second.209
Our aesthetic judgments are not just rapid, but reliable. Within 750
milliseconds, listeners can judge how much they like a musical excerpt and
do so with a high degree of accuracy, i.e., the judgment about that excerpt
remains the same even after hearing the entire piece.210 One might think that
past experiences with both similar and different creative works, as well as
other relevant memories, would be determinative in this process. Yet
research reveals that we do not need to comb through our frames of
reference to enjoy art. “[A]esthetic pleasure comes into being without
analysis, consideration, or reliance on—or reference to—former perceptual
experiences.” 211 Our previous experiences are relevant to aesthetic
appreciation, but they are not necessary.
Proving the speed at which aesthetic judgments occur is important
because the faster these judgments, the more one can argue that there is little
time in this process for objectively weighing a work’s different components.
One cognitive scientist puts it this way: “Since the timescale of the brain’s
functional activity is in the order of milliseconds, complex processes take
place very quickly, leading to a qualitative, simple subjective conclusion
about the beauty of a stimulus.”212
The other important insight neuroscience provides with regard to the
timing of aesthetic experience is that our aesthetic responses fade over time.
For a long while, psychologists have believed that audiences exhibit
“aesthetic fatigue” after experiencing a stimulus too often or for too long of
205. Id.
206. Leder & Nadal, supra note 202, at 448; Eugen B. Petcu, The Rationale for a Redefinition of
Visual Art Based on Neuroaesthetic Principles, 51 LEONARDO 59, 59 (2018).
207. Peel & Co. v. Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 2001).
208. Vessel, supra note 163, at 10.
209. Cela-Conde et al., supra note 186, at 42.
210. Amy M. Belfi, Anna Kasdan, Jess Rowland, Edward A. Vessel, G. Gabrielle Starr & David
Poeppel, Rapid Timing of Musical Aesthetic Judgments, 147 J. EXP. PSYCH: GENERAL 1531, 1532–35
(2018).
211. Zhihong Li, Yanhui Wang & Fanjun Meng, Aesthetic Cognitive Module Theory: A Core
Structure, 52 J. AESTHETIC EDUC. 71, 79 (2018).
212. Cela-Conde et al., supra note 186, at 42.
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a period of time. 213 Neuroscientists confirm this phenomenon,
demonstrating that neurons in the brain regulate movements meant to orient
an observer to a surprising stimulus but that when the surprise event is
repeated, a habituation takes place that decreases this neural response.214
This discovery allows one to measure the speed at which aesthetic responses
decrease over time.215
Relatedly, neuroaesthetic research examines the roles that familiarity and
novelty play in aesthetic judgment. Although a certain amount of familiarity
can be attractive and enhance a work’s aesthetic appeal, most observers
respond positively to novelty. In fact, there is some evidence that all positive
aesthetic evaluation requires some degree of novelty. Research into
audience appreciation of music reveals that novelty is critical to attention to
and favorable evaluation of musical works. As the perception of novelty
declines, so do favorability ratings. 216 Neural activity can reveal when
someone is experiencing a reaction of surprise.217 In fact, there are even
specific “novelty neurons” as well as “familiarity neurons” identified by
researchers. 218 Novelty may be a particularly important characteristic to
identify as the activity of these novelty neurons predicts the likelihood we
will form a memory of the stimulus.219
Although it would be difficult to accurately discern the degree of
audience familiarity or novelty in a creative work such that this information
could be used in the substantial similarity analysis, these findings confirm
current judicial understandings of the speed and durability of aesthetic
judgment. Casual, fast reviews of stimuli provide the best window into the
aesthetic experience. Lengthy deliberations over the merits of a creative
work can distort or partially obscure those merits.220 Hence, neuroaesthetic
213. Kate Hevner, The Aesthetic Experience: A Psychological Description, 44 PSYCH. REV. 245,
249 (1937).
214. Jean-Pierre Changeaux, Art and Neuroscience, 27 LEONARDO 189, 199 (1994).
215. STARR, supra note 164, at 102.
216. Id. at 119.
217. ARMSTRONG, supra note 168, at 22.
218. Moran Cerf, Eric Greenleaf, Tom Meyvis & Vicki G. Morwitz, Using Single-Neuron
Recording in Marketing: Opportunities, Challenges, and an Application to Fear Enhancement in
Communications, 52 J. MKTG. RES. 530, 534 (2015) (identifying “familiarity neurons” in the amygdala
that show increased firing rates when subject views images that had previously been seen); Jan Kamiń
ski, Adam N. Mamelak, Kurtis Birch, Clayton P. Mosher, Michele Tagliati & Ueli Rutishauser, NoveltySensitive Dopaminergic Neurons in the Human Substantia Nigra Predict Success of Declarative
Memory Formation, 28 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1333, 1340 (2018) (identifying “novelty neurons” in the
hippocampus that exhibited larger firing rates when subject views novel rather than familiar images).
219. STARR, supra note 164, at 119; Kamiński, supra note 218, at 1334.
220. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (2005);
Joseph M. Melcher & Jonathan W. Schooler, The Misremembrance of Wines Past: Verbal and
Perceptual Expertise Differentially Mediate Verbal Overshadowing of Taste Memory, 35 J. MEMORY &
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research offers evidentiary support for the substantial similarity status quo
when it comes to the temporal dynamics of aesthetic judgment.221
C. Concerns and Limitations
Neuroaesthetics is not without its skeptics. Some worry that, despite
advances in spatial resolution and processing speed, imaging technologies
cannot hope to describe a cognitive process as complex as aesthetic
judgment.222 Others contend that neuroscience offers nothing to the study of
aesthetics because it posits biological causation for a process that is much
more ethereal. 223 Finally, there is a concern that neuroaesthetics fails to
capture the real world context of artistic appreciation.224
It is true that the process of aesthetic judgment is complex. Even though
it occurs incredibly quickly, aesthetic judgment relies on a host of mental
processes—perception, cognition, and affect—in a dynamic process. Critics
who complain that aesthetic judgment cannot be located in one area of the
brain are right.225 It will not be possible for researchers to look at a single
biological unit to determine when someone is processing artistic stimuli.
Nor will judges be able to look for activation in one neural terrain to
determine if an audience will recognize one creative work as coming from
another. Moreover, because many of the neural processes behind aesthetic
response also apply to other sensory experiences, researchers need to be
careful to avoid the problem of reverse inference. It is useful to discover that
engaging in a particular cognitive process—like a judgment that a creative
work is “beautiful”—produces activity in particular brain regions. But it is
not fair to infer that activity in a particular brain region always signals that

LANGUAGE 231, 231 (1996) (non-expert wine drinkers do worse at recognizing wines when asked to
describe them).
221. Other areas of the law may emphasize the need for a slower, more deliberative approach. For
example, some contend that neuroscientific study of the role of emotion in normative judgment supports
giving decisionmakers in criminal cases extra time to make an assessment of guilt or innocence. See
Oliver R. Goodenough & Kristin Prehn, A Neuroscientific Approach to Normative Judgment in Law and
Justice, 359 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC’Y LONDON B 1709, 1719 (2005) (“In determining culpability and
[meting] out punishment, the delay inherent in procedures of criminal law can intercede to prevent the
quicker action of emotion driven judgments of immediate justice. Although some emotional content is
probably inevitable and necessary in reviewing criminal allegations, letting the quick, intuitive and
emotional impulse to punish dissipate before judgment and action take place may lead to preferable
results in a complex society.”).
222. See infra note 226 and accompanying text.
223. See infra notes 230–231 and accompanying text.
224. See infra notes 237–239 and accompanying text.
225. Dahlia W. Zaidel, Brain and Art: Neuro-Clues from the Intersection of Disciplines, in
NEUROAESTHETICS, supra note 14, at 158, 164 (finding that “multiple components of art defy functional
localization” in the brain).
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the subject is engaging in a particular cognitive process.226
The neural circuity of aesthetic response is complex, but it is not
unknowable nor is it hopeless to expect to understand it better. Scientists
realize that they need to study neural networks acting across the brain at
different times and not just the activity of a single region. At this point,
neuroscientists are not looking for an “art button” in the brain. Instead, they
apply advanced cognitive models that involve multiple brain regions and
overlapping neural networks.227 As noted, particular attention has been paid
to the default mode network, a neural circuit that constantly measures the
sensory environment and, hence, appears germane to the processing of
artistic stimuli. 228 Other networks track the reward value of a stimulus,
which can be useful in determining what is pleasing to the ear of an audience
member.229 The problem of reverse inference is a concern, but it requires
caution before attributing neural activity solely to an aspect of the aesthetic
experience, not a wholesale abandonment of neuroaesthetic research.
Skeptics might press their point by maintaining that even if researchers
acknowledge the biological complexity of the aesthetic experience, that
complexity represents a barrier to understanding audiences that researchers
have yet to cross. Scientists have gotten better in the last decade at decoding
the different brain regions involved in aesthetic encounters, but they are still
far removed from answering some of the basic questions one might want to
know to fully comprehend the physiology of audience reaction. For
example, at this point, when someone recognizes a particular stimulus, brain
scans cannot determine whether the person is relying on a true memory (i.e.,
something that really happened to the person) instead of a false one.230 The
philosopher John Hyman questioned what good can come of neuroaesthetic
study if we cannot tell if an audience member viewing an image of a
voluptuous woman is responding to the artistry used to create the image or
sensuous impulses one might feel regardless of creative technique.231
Hyman is right that neuroscientists have not cracked the code on exactly
226. Anjan Chatterjee, Neuroaesthetics: A Coming of Age Story, 23 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
53, 59 (2011); see also Craig M. Bennett, Abigail A. Baird, Michael B. Miller & George L. Wolford,
Neural Correlates of Interspecies Perspective Taking in the Post-Mortem Atlantic Salmon: An Argument
for Proper Multiple Comparisons Correction, 1 J. SERENDIPITOUS & UNEXPECTED RESULTS 1, 1 (2009)
(using scan of dead fish that supposedly exhibited brain activity when being exposed to photographs of
human subjects to illustrate the need for more correction for chance correlations in fMRI research).
227. Pearce et al., supra note 15, at 269.
228. STARR, supra note 164, at 63–64; Reybrouck, supra note 15, at 5.
229. Brown et al., supra note 186, at 255.
230. Joyce W. Lacy & Craig E.L. Stark, The Neuroscience of Memory: Implications for the
Courtroom, 14 NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 649, 654–55 (2013).
231. John Hyman, Art & Neuroscience, in BEYOND MIMESIS AND CONVENTION:
REPRESENTATION IN ART AND SCIENCE 245, 250 (Roman Frigg & Matthew Hunter eds., 2010).
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what makes aesthetic experiences unique. But they are aware of this.
Experimenters routinely caution that aesthetic responses overlap with other
biological processes and that reactions to creative works can look the same
as reactions to other stimuli.232 Aesthetic experiences involve many of the
same biological processes as other experiences, but this does not make their
study useless. As it stands now, the audience test offers no predictive ability
for litigants or content for courts in review. Insights into how audiences
process creative works (and confirming that there is indeed a unique biology
to aesthetic thought) represent an improvement from the status quo even if
it is not yet possible to identify every part of what makes aesthetic responses
unique.
Hyman’s critique also seems to fault neuroscientists for not offering an
answer to a question that has haunted aesthetic philosophers for centuries.
He rightly contends that fMRI imaging cannot tell us what should be
considered art and what should not. 233 But it is not necessary for
neuroscience to resolve this philosophical conundrum before it can help us
understand the aesthetic experience. Brain scans will never be able to
explain what makes for good artwork. Instead, neuroaesthetics can provide
information on the biological mechanisms behind the enjoyment of some
artworks but not others.234 If one defines aesthetics to include the study of
all stimuli generating positive emotions, then it would seem that
neuroscientists can provide valuable information on aesthetic responses.235
This may not match Hyman’s definition of aesthetics, but that is not the fault
of scientists trying to describe a mental process while avoiding making
normative claims about art appreciation.236
Other objections to neuroaesthetic study are more specific.237 One might
question the ability of neuroscientists to recreate the real-world conditions
of aesthetic judgment. This is important because the substantial similarity
test calls for the trier of fact to experience creative works in the same manner
as their intended audiences.238 Seeing an image of a painting while being
scanned in an fMRI machine is not the same as seeing the original in a
232. See, e.g., Kirsch et al., supra note 195, at 65 (discussing need for and strategies to disentangle
neural evidence of aesthetic experience from general, non-aesthetic emotional responses).
233. Id. at 260.
234. Marcos Nadal, The Experience of Art: Insights from Neuroimaging, 204 PROGRESS BRAIN
RES. 135, 153 (2013).
235. See Kirsch et al., supra note 195, at 58.
236. Neuroscientists define aesthetic much more broadly than just experiencing art. According to
one definition, “[a]esthetics, as generally understood, focuses on properties of objects and our emotional
responses to those properties.” CHATTERJEE, supra note 19, at 115–16.
237. For a discussion of whether neuroimaging experiments can offer meaningful data on
audiences given their small sample sizes, see supra Part I.B.
238. See supra Part I.A.
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museum. Experiments often confront participants with long successions of
artworks divorced from their typical context.239
Those working in neuroaesthetics are sensitive to these concerns.
Contexts have been varied in an effort to determine when a contextual
change will influence the neural processes behind aesthetic judgment. For
example, researchers try to partially recreate the art museum context by
telling some subjects that the images they are viewing are “gallery art.”240
And not all studies are undertaken in artificial lab conditions. Researchers
have sampled the reactions of actual museum visitors and live concert
goers.241 Moreover, as the technology for neural imaging becomes more
portable, the opportunities for recreating the context surrounding creative
works will only multiply. Already, in private industry and in government
studies, researchers use portable EEG devices to measure subjects’ neural
responses in shopping malls and on battlefields.242
In sum, neuroaesthetic research offers information that could be relevant
to copyright law’s infringement analysis in a variety of ways. First, it both
confirms and calls into question some background assumptions underlying
the audience test. Aesthetic response operates automatically, supporting the
current approach to evaluating substantial similarity in a way that avoids
labored deliberation over the similarities in two works. These responses
differ greatly, however, depending on the type of art form at issue and the
level of familiarity the audience has with the art form. Copyright law’s
current insistence on a uniform approach to audience and art work fails to
capture the biological realities of the aesthetic experience. Second,
neuroaesthetics suggests ways to potentially measure the strength of
aesthetic responses. Current technologies do not allow for an inquiry into
all aspects of aesthetic encounters, but the ability to assess audience reaction
when experiencing a creative work represents a marked improvement over
the black box that currently houses the substantial similarity analysis.
Although there are many limitations on our ability to use neuroscience to
comprehend audiences, copyright law does not insist on perfect
understanding; it only looks to an aggregate appreciation. The next Part
wrestles with the normative implications of a neuroaesthetic approach to
substantial similarity, asking whether the improved understanding of
239. Cela-Conde et al., supra note 186, at 47.
240. Ulrich Kirk, Martin Skov, Oliver Hulme, Mark S. Christensen & Semir Zeki, Modulation of
Aesthetic Value by Semantic Context: An fMRI Study, 44 NEUROIMAGE 1125, 1126 (2009).
241. Pearce et al., supra note 15, at 270.
242. Srivari Aishwarya, US Army Researchers Explore Brain’s Influence on Soldiers Pulling the
Trigger, ARMY TECH. (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.army-technology.com/uncategorised/newsus-researc
hers-explore-brain-waves-influence-on-soldiers-twitchy-trigger-finger-4971270/ [https://perma.cc/V5
UG-FEQ7].
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audiences explored in Parts I and II can actually improve the quality of the
copyright infringement analysis.
III. IS NEUROAESTHETICS GOOD FOR COPYRIGHT?
It might seem that any tool that helps courts better understand the thought
processes of audiences should be embraced to improve the quality of
infringement decisions. There are reasons, however, to be cautious when
importing scientific insights into copyright doctrine. Ultimately, the
substantial similarity test involves a policy decision. A better understanding
of audiences could make the copyright infringement analysis worse, not
better, if such an understanding is not aligned with the underlying normative
considerations that justify copyright protection.243
After offering some thoughts on neuroaesthetics’ normative
implications, this final Part examines not only what related changes would
be good for copyright law but also what is possible. The historical record
shows that it is only in a particularized zone of insight—one that challenges
current understandings but does not clash with fundamental legal
precepts—that law and psychology are successfully married. To influence
copyright law, any reform efforts based on neuroaesthetic discoveries will
need to fit within this zone as well. Three doctrinal suggestions—(1) using
experts to tailor the substantial similarity analysis to different kinds of
artistic works; (2) accepting survey evidence to better understand the
aesthetic responses of specialized audiences; and (3) reordering the
infringement analysis to debias judges and jurors—steer this middle course
while promising to improve the law of copyright infringement.
A. The Normative Implications of a Neuroaesthetic Approach to
Infringement
Thanks to a nineteenth-century view of audience reaction to creative
works as unavoidably subjective, copyright law’s substantial similarity
analysis has been on auto pilot for decades. Cognitive neuroscience
demonstrates that the audience test rests on some flawed assumptions about
the measurability and generalizability of the aesthetic experience. Armed
with neural data, courts could begin to recalibrate the substantial similarity
analysis in accordance with the ways our minds really think.
Neuroaesthetics may also prompt a willingness to replace copyright’s
243. See David L. Faigman, Where Law and Science (and Religion?) Meet, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1659,
1678–79 (2015) (maintaining that the law can and should borrow from science but “[i]n regard to what
science might offer, then, the law ought to be a sophisticated consumer”).
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current one-size-fits-all approach to understanding audiences, instead
placing more emphasis on the actual likely listeners and observers for
different kinds of creative expression.
Before rushing to reform the substantial similarity analysis, however, we
should first ask some fundamental questions. Just because aesthetic
response can now be measured does not mean that those measurements
should guide the infringement determination. There are reasons to be wary
of using scientific measurement. Those worried that such measurements
will do violence to the humanistic values embedded in copyright law may
call for their continued exclusion. A contrasting position, one that advocates
for purging aesthetic considerations from the infringement calculus
altogether, would have the same effect: stopping neuroscience’s influence
on copyright law before it can get started. I address these two concerns
before turning to some specific and realizable recommendations for
importing neuroscientific insights into the substantial similarity analysis in
light of copyright law’s normative commitments.
1. Copyright Law and the Two Cultures
There has long been a sense that science is at odds with art appreciation.
Science and the humanities represent “two cultures,” with the former being
described as objective and the latter defined by its insistent subjectivity.244
This dichotomy is inscribed not only in popular perception but also in the
law of intellectual property. The Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause
separates the “Sciences” from the “useful Arts,” prompting divergent legal
approaches to the two categories.245 Patent law categorizes the sciences as
susceptible to a qualitative measure of “Progress.” By contrast, courts posit
that such a measurement is not possible for copyright law. The arts are
described as necessarily “useless” and their progress only loosely tied to the
sheer quantity of such works generated.246
For some, any proposal to welcome neuroscientific evidence of audience
reaction into copyright law risks violating the theoretical and constitutional
separation of these two realms. At its heart, neuroaesthetics forces a partial
reconception of our experience of creative works, painting this experience
as a matter of biology. This shift can be jarring for its implied displacement

244. C.P. SNOW, THE TWO CULTURES (Canto ed. 1993); see also Peter Lee, Patent Law and the
Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 11–15 (2010) (contrasting the different “cultures” of patent and
copyright law).
245. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
246. Beebe, supra note 74, at 358; see also id. at 359 (quoting Justice Holmes: “one of the grounds
of aesthetic pleasure is waste”).
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of longstanding cultural considerations. 247 Perhaps some injection of
empirical assessment into aesthetics can be tolerated, but, if too concerned
with finding objective answers, neuroscientists may create those answers
even if they do not truly describe what makes art pleasurable to audiences.248
It does not help that the things being studied—“beauty,” “pleasure,”
“similarity”—lack universally accepted definitions. The vague, undefined
nature of aesthetic experience, it is feared, will give scientists too much
leverage to impose their own definitions.249 As one philosopher wrote with
regard to psychological studies of art appreciation, “I am convinced that the
problem of the description of the nature of aesthetic experience is not a task
to which the techniques of empirical science are relevant.”250 Anxious art
historians and critics complain that neuroscientists rarely consult their work
when charting new discoveries in aesthetic science.251
A related critique when it comes to neuroaesthetics stems from the
tendency of neuroscientists to study “classic” artistic representations,
thereby embedding—in a supposedly objective analysis of aesthetic
experience—their own tastes and predispositions. Many neuroaesthetic
experiments expose subjects to paintings and sculptures in what would now
be considered traditional styles. At the same time, by searching for the
biological signs of aesthetic beauty and pleasure, neuroscientists can be
accused of reifying outdated aesthetic theories.252 For example, art critic
Blake Gopnik accuses neuroscientists of using their enhanced ability to
study viewer sensations to only chase an old-fashioned view of art as
dependent on a work’s formal properties.253 Better to investigate the work’s
meaning, and related social and historical backdrop, he says, which cannot
be elucidated so easily through neural imaging.254 Otherwise, the scientists
conducting neural studies of audiences will impose their own artistic tastes
on copyright law, giving short shrift to conceptual art or other artistic
movements that do not square with an old, Enlightenment view of
247. CHATTERJEE, supra note 19, at 123 (“The view of art as a biological imperative clashes with
the view of art as a cultural artifact.”).
248. Bevil R. Conway & Alexander Rehding, Neuroaesthetics and the Trouble with Beauty, 11
PLOS BIOLOGY 1, 4 (2013) (“In trying to crack the subjective beauty nut with scientific, objective
information, we also run the risk of fueling a normative, possibly dangerous campaign through which
science is required to valorize our experience.”).
249. See WILLIAM R. UTTAL, MIND AND BRAIN: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 21–22 (2011) (lamenting the unreliable results triggered from neuroscientific study of
vague or undetermined concepts).
250. George Dickie, Is Psychology Relevant to Aesthetics?, 71 PHIL. REV. 285, 302 (1962).
251. Blake Gopnik, Aesthetic Science and Artistic Knowledge, in AESTHETIC SCIENCE:
CONNECTING MINDS, BRAINS, AND EXPERIENCE 129, 130 (A.P. Shinmamura & S.E. Palmer eds., 2012).
252. CHATTERJEE, supra note 19, at xxi.
253. Gopnik, supra note 251, at 129.
254. Id.
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aesthetics.255
It seems wrong, however, to insist that our understanding of aesthetic
experiences cannot be improved by new knowledge of neural architectures.
Neuroscientists need to be careful about instantiating eighteenth-century
theories of aesthetics into experiments meant to track how twenty-firstcentury audiences perceive creative works. A single-minded focus on
“beauty” would recreate the way eighteenth-century philosophers thought
about art, but do a disservice to particular kinds of creative works.256 Studies
involving only classical works of art will of course privilege certain art
forms over others. But researchers are increasingly evaluating different
kinds of art, including conceptual art.257 In its earliest stages, it made sense
for neuroaesthetic study to focus on works of art that enjoyed the most
popular acclaim, thereby minimizing individual variance when it comes to
perceiving a work as “beautiful.” This prompted a reliance on more
traditional works. But it seems likely that a broader description of the
different inputs for aesthetic experience will come as the body of scientific
studies grows.
Nor is it impossible to conceive of a new understanding of aesthetic
encounters that borrows from both of the two cultures. Despite treating
science and art as two separate subjects, copyright law and patent law
sometimes borrow from each other,258 a cross-pollination that can be viewed
as a strength and not a weakness. 259 Neuroaesthetic data, rather than
replacing the reported aesthetic reactions of observers and listeners, can act
as a valuable supplement to articulated notions of beauty, pleasure, and
similarity. Part of the value of neuroaesthetic study is that it can supply
evidence of mental processes that individuals cannot perceive or describe
on their own. 260 Yet the goal is not to ignore conscious explorations of
255.
256.
257.

Id.
See Brown et al., supra note 186, at 250–51.
E.g., PAUL M.W. HACKETT, PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF ABSTRACT ART: NEUROAESTHETICS, PERCEPTION, AND COMPREHENSION (2016); Vered Aviv, What Does the Brain Tell Us
About Abstract Art?, 8 FRONTIERS HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE 85 (2014).
258. E.g., Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1536 (2017) (applying
rules for international exhaustion of copyright rights to patent rights); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439–42 (1984) (using the Patent Act’s grant of immunity for
contributory infringement for sellers of “staple articles” to craft a similar exemption in copyright law);
BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 881 F.3d 293, 307–08 (4th Cir. 2018) (relying
on jurisprudence of contributory patent infringement claims to allow imputation of intent for
contributory copyright infringement claims when a defendant “knows that its action . . . is substantially
certain to result in infringement.”).
259. Clark D. Asay, Intellectual Property Law Hybridization, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 65, 70 (2016);
cf. Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 484 (2010)
(endorsing “constitutional borrowing” from one area of constitutional law to the other).
260. See Solso, supra note 18, at 77.
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aesthetic encounters. Scientists check fMRI data derived from experiments
on brain function against “reliable first-person accounts of consciousness,”
rather than replace reported descriptions of aesthetic experience
altogether.261 Objective evidence of audience reactions can be incorporated
into the substantial similarity analysis without independently defining it.
Doctrinal innovations can rely on neuroscientific findings to help inform the
substantial similarity analysis without completely determining that analysis.
A related concern comes from the danger outside evidence of audience
reaction poses to aesthetic pluralism. Although the overwhelming scholarly
consensus is that the substantial similarity test needs more definition, for
some, this lack of specificity should be considered a feature, not a bug. For
example, Shyam Balganesh celebrates the undetermined nature of the test.
Because it is so difficult to determine a work’s aesthetic value and whether
that value has been appropriated by the defendant, the audience test affords
the trier of fact the opportunity to consider more than the economic effects
of the appropriation, allowing for “the introduction and instantiation of
plural values into the copyright analysis.” 262
In a related vein, Brian Soucek warns against the legal imposition of
aesthetic orthodoxy. 263 Soucek does not caution against aesthetic
discrimination because judges are ill-equipped to make aesthetic judgments
or because the subjective nature of aesthetic judgment makes any attempt to
determine the “best” aesthetic approach a losing proposition. Rather, he
submits that the First Amendment commands aesthetic neutrality. 264
Because some aesthetic judgment in the test for copyright infringement is
unavoidable, one might conclude that the infringement analysis should be
structured so that the state does not shrink the array of acceptable aesthetic
choices.265 If the vagueness of today’s audience test aids this commitment
to aesthetic pluralism, a more structured test, responsive to biological
evidence of audience reaction, might do the opposite.
Balganesh and Soucek are right to celebrate aesthetic pluralism as a
worthwhile consideration, but some tension between the need for greater
261. ARMSTRONG, supra note 168, at 20.
262. Balganesh, supra note 117, at 233, 253.
263. Soucek, supra note 100, at 448–58.
264. Id.
265. Soucek argues that unlike obscenity law and zoning ordinances, where “the government is
undeniably in the business of regulating expression,” copyright protection might be construed as a mere
government subsidy for the speech of authors, thereby neutralizing concerns that the substantial
similarity test could result in a “state-imposed aesthetic orthodoxy” that violates the First Amendment.
Id. at 459–61. Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence puts this argument in doubt. See Matal v. Tam, 137
S. Ct. 1744, 1760–62 (2017) (refusing to consider the federal protection of registered trademarks as a
subsidy or as government speech that can avoid First Amendment proscription on viewpoint
discrimination).

574

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 98:525

specificity in the definition of infringement and the desire to protect
aesthetic pluralism is inevitable. Copyright policymakers need to weigh the
costs and benefits of one approach against another rather than valuing
pluralism over all other values. The years of frustration voiced by copyright
scholars and judges over the substantial similarity test testifies to a
consensus that the law has moved too far along the spectrum toward
plurality and away from predictability. Lack of specifics makes copyright
cases notoriously expensive as even somewhat specious claims become
incapable of resolution before trial. Predictability is not the only value at
stake in copyright jurisprudence, but it should be a central one.266
The audience test’s unbounded nature allows for bias. In its present form,
the audience test not only defies predictability but also permits wide
disparities in the success rates of infringement suits depending on artistic
medium. Plaintiffs claiming infringement of a musical composition fare far
better than those alleging improper appropriation of a literary copyright.267
There may be good reasons for some of this discrepancy, but the problem
with the current state of infringement law is that we have no way of finding
out why the discrepancy exists. The infringement black box makes it
impossible to discern potential failures in judgment. Perhaps the variance in
infringement decisions reflects a desirable, ecumenical approach to art
appreciation. But it also likely stems from decisionmaking errors, as when
a jury bases its decision on unprotectable attributes of the plaintiff’s work
or on a retributive impulse after learning the defendant engaged in some
intentional copying.268
Given these considerations, some potential sacrifice of aesthetic
pluralism in favor of a more determined substantial similarity analysis is
desirable. In addition, the specific reforms prompted by neuroaesthetic
findings can be designed to do as little harm to pluralist values as possible.
For example, one suggestion, described in more detail below, is to alter the
infringement analysis to take into account the ways in which aesthetic
encounters differ depending on the kind of work at issue.269 By leveraging
neuroaesthetic findings to recalibrate the law of substantial similarity,
copyright reformers can make infringement more determined while at the
266. Kem Thompson Frost, Predictability in the Law, Prized Yet Not Promoted: A Study in
Judicial Priorities, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 48, 52 & n.4 (2015) (offering examples of “the high value courts
place on attaining predictability in the law”); Jennifer Understahl, Copyright Infringement and Poetry:
When Is A Red Wheelbarrow The Red Wheelbarrow?, 58 VAND. L. REV. 915, 949 (2005)
(“Predictability is important because it allows authors to understand the limits of their protectible
expression and the boundaries of acceptable borrowing from prior works.”).
267. Lowe, supra note 90, at 28, 30.
268. Balganesh et al., supra note 34, at 281.
269. See infra Part III.B.1.
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same time avoiding a uniform approach to aesthetic judgment.
2. Avoiding Aesthetics
On the other side of the spectrum from those concerned with an overly
circumscribed view of aesthetic reaction would be those who believe that
aesthetic judgment should have no place in the infringement calculus at all.
A frequent suggestion in the scholarly literature is to replace the vagaries of
the audience test with a mechanism that more directly considers the
economic harms of infringement.270 Such a change would better align the
infringement test with copyright’s utilitarian goals, the argument goes,
while also having the advantage of making infringement cases more
predictable.
There is also a doctrinal argument for purging aesthetic judgment from
the substantial similarity calculus. An avoidance of aesthetic concerns
would seem to follow what is “arguably the most influential copyright
opinion the [Supreme] Court has ever produced.” 271 In Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes cautioned
against decisionmakers making any sort of qualitative, aesthetic judgment
when setting the boundaries of copyrightability.272 Out of fear of judicial
bias in favor of traditional art and against the avant-garde, Holmes deemed
it better to avoid any evaluation of aesthetic merit at all. For a century,
Bleistein has influenced decisions about the standard for assessing whether
a work was sufficiently original to enjoy copyright protection.
Bleistein’s influence on the specific issue of copyright infringement has
been more muted, but only because of the presumed impossibility of
measuring audience reactions. By assuming that an audience’s aesthetic
judgment was impenetrable, courts were able to believe the substantial
similarity analysis avoided the imposition of any aesthetic orthodoxy. After
all, if one could not discern how jurors arrived at their infringement
determinations, then arguably one could not steer those determinations in
any particular direction. The longstanding prohibition on expert testimony
and audience surveys served as additional safeguards against influences that
might violate Bleistein’s aesthetic non-discrimination principle when
evaluating substantial similarity.
Decisions about the admissibility of scientific evidence of aesthetic
response tread much closer to an explicit qualitative judgment about art.
270. See, e.g., Laura G. Lape, The Metaphysics of the Law: Bringing Substantial Similarity down
to Earth, 98 DICK. L. REV. 181, 194–204 (1994); Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1845–47 (2013).
271. Beebe, supra note 74, at 329.
272. 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
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Judicial choices about the probativity of such evidence would require
decisions about how to prioritize findings that audiences find particular
aspects of a work to be “beautiful” or just “noise.” Rather than revising the
audience test to incorporate this evidence and risk offending Bleistein, one
might be tempted to jettison aesthetic concerns altogether. Such an antiaesthetic approach would render neuroaesthetics of no value for copyright
law.
There are a few reasons not to excise aesthetic concerns from copyright
infringement, however. First, it may be impossible. As multiple scholars
point out, judges frequently disclaim aesthetic principles in copyright cases
while in fact relying on their own aesthetic sympathies to decide cases.273
By maintaining that judges should not evaluate aesthetic merit, the Bleistein
decision effectively adopts its own aesthetic theory, one that assesses
aesthetic worth based on a work’s “commercial value.” 274 Considering
evidence of aesthetic reaction would at least make judicial sympathies more
transparent.
Second, a non-aesthetic approach would likely substitute financial
concerns for aesthetic ones. Some copyright scholars call for explicitly
tethering commercial value to the infringement calculation. In 2010, a group
proposed to change substantial similarity to “require the copyright owner to
prove commercial harm in order to prove infringement of the owner’s
exclusive rights.” 275 They maintained that this doctrinal reform would
replace the audience test’s subjectivity with an objective way to ascertain
when appropriation of a creative work is improper.276
We should question whether an infringement determination based solely
on market harm, and no longer reliant on aesthetic reaction, would make
sense. First, to the extent copyright law is designed to preserve financial
incentives for authors, it is likely that other components of copyright
doctrine are already doing the job. The threshold question of eligibility for
copyright protection depends more on a work’s potential marketability than
its creativity.277 Copyright’s fair use defense also relies heavily on economic
harm. In evaluating the defense, courts must consider four statutory factors,
273. See Beebe, supra note 74, at 386; Walker & Depoorter, supra note 111, at 358–71; Yen,
supra note 25, at 266–97.
274. See Beebe, supra note 74, at 330; see also Soucek, supra note 100, at 386 (“[A]cceding to
relativism is itself a substantive aesthetic judgment, not an avoidance of such judgments, as Holmes’s
followers seem to believe.”).
275. Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1211 (2010). The group also suggested that proof of commercial harm
should not be required to prove substantial similarity when the defendant was using “all or virtually all
of a copyrighted work.” Id.
276. Id. at 1209–13.
277. See Beebe, supra note 74, at 373–74.
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including “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.” 278 The Supreme Court described this factor as the
“single most important element [in determining] fair use,”279 and even as
subsequent decisions have caused the fair use determination to evolve,
federal courts continue to consider market harm to be of primary
importance.280
Second, doctrine meant to emphasize financial considerations can have
adverse consequences. For many, copyright law has become an engine for
inequality. Tethering copyright protection to market value has produced a
star system where the biggest entertainment companies and the most wellknown celebrities gain the most from the law.281 Beebe cautions that the
Bleistein decision, by employing “a market definition of aesthetic progress”
in a supposed effort to avoid aesthetic discrimination, made the mistake of
privileging the propertization of objects rather than valuing the creative
process itself. 282 Yoking infringement exclusively to market value could
have its own pernicious effects. It could fuel an unthinking “if value, then
right” tendency in intellectual property law, enlarging the scope of
copyright without considering competing values like the need for a robust
public domain to provide raw material for new works of authorship.283
To address these concerns, non-economic values should remain part of
the copyright infringement analysis. As Andrew Gilden persuasively
argues, copyright decisions involving issues of copyrightability and fair use
often employ economic rhetoric to justify the clandestine upholding of
noneconomic interests such as sexual privacy, religious freedom, and
democratic discourse.284 Gilden objects to the use of “market gibberish” to
obfuscate the real values that are being vindicated in these cases.285 The
substantial similarity test potentially serves as a mechanism for supporting
and articulating these values. But, in its current incarnation, there is not even
“gibberish” to rely on to determine what is going on.
The answer is not to abandon aesthetic analysis altogether. If the subject
matter of copyright protection makes such analysis unavoidable, then
copyright law should change to make its selection of aesthetic principles
278. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
279. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
280. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Decisions, 1978-2005, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 549, 617 (2008).
281. MARTIN SKLADANY, BIG COPYRIGHT VERSUS THE PEOPLE 3 (2018); Lea Shaver, Copyright
and Inequality, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 117, 141 (2014).
282. Beebe, supra note 74, at 351.
283. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535,
1575 (2005).
284. Andrew Gilden, Copyright’s Market Gibberish, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1019 (2019).
285. Id. at 1025–58.
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open and notorious. As Gilden writes, “[i]f courts are going to engage in a
deeply subjective endeavor, influenced by a wide variety of considerations,
those considerations should at least be allowed to come to the surface.”286
Aesthetic reactions can serve as a proxy for additional values beyond
preserving the financial incentives of authors. Neurological measurement
has the potential to make these values more legible and prevent courts from
hiding behind an outdated, mystical view of aesthetic experience.
B. The Right Way to Incorporate Neuroscience into Copyright Law
Below I offer some suggestions for how neuroaesthetic findings can
improve copyright infringement decisionmaking, using the lessons of
neuroaesthetics to justify doctrinal reforms. These are general proposals that
deserve further refinement in future work. They may not be realized
immediately given the inertia of copyright lawmaking. Nevertheless, such
reforms become increasingly likely as neuroaesthetics matures as a research
field and courts grow more dissatisfied with the flawed state of the
substantial similarity status quo.
1. Different Aesthetic Approaches for Different Creative Media
If there was ever a doubt that audiences evaluate different artistic media
in different ways, neuroscience has put those doubts to rest. Particular areas
of the brain process, store, and retrieve music, but are not activated by other
types of creative expression.287 We tend to dissect musical works into their
component parts while evaluating images holistically. This suggests that the
common substantial similarity instruction that the trier of fact should assess
whether two works have the same “look and feel” tracks actual audience
experiences for some media but not others.288
Neuroaesthetics shows that the answer is not to stick with a universal
approach to substantial similarity regardless of art form. Instead, expert
testimony is needed to help the trier of fact understand which aspects of a
work will be most salient to audiences depending on artistic medium. For
example, an expert could provide the trier of fact with knowledge that, for
music, the similarity of a particular segment to another should be more
telling than in non-music cases. Given the scientific evidence, jurors should
not be told to rely on “total sound effect” when determining substantial
286. Id. at 1081–82.
287. OLIVER SACKS, MUSICOPHILIA: TALES OF MUSIC AND THE BRAIN 117–18 (2008); Margit
Livingston & Joseph Urbinato, Copyright Infringement of Music: Determining Whether What Sounds
Alike Is Alike, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 227, 280 (2013).
288. See supra Part II.A.1.
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similarity in music copyright cases as they are today.289
Not every copyright case warrants expert testimony.290 Scientists have
more insight into some kinds of aesthetic encounters than others, which
should be reflected in the substantial similarity analysis. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, abstract art prompts more varied aesthetic reactions than
representational art.291 Neuroscientists have had more success at isolating
emotional reactions to musical works than other creative works. 292 This
might mean that music cases or representational art cases can begin to utilize
neural evidence whereas other infringement matters will need to wait until
our understanding of the relevant aesthetic reaction improves.293 Given the
findings of neuroaesthetic research, the current prohibition on all expert
guidance regardless of art form seems inappropriate.
2. Surveying Audience Difference
Neuroaesthetics demonstrates that copyright law’s general assumption
of audience universality is wrong. Gender, familiarity with a particular art
form, and other factors impact perception of creative works. 294 Because
there is more variability in audiences than the law has assumed, there needs
to be further guidance from courts to allow the trier of fact to adopt the
perspective of intended audience members. Surveys should be admitted to
help judges and jurors understand different audiences.
289. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 476 (1946) (Clark, J., dissenting).
290. Gathering data on the perceptions and experiences of a target audience can be expensive and
may not be worth it in the majority of copyright infringement cases. Thomas M.S. Hemnes, The
Adaptation of Copyright Law to Video Games, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 226 (1982) (contending that the
ordinary observer test “encourages judicial economy and avoids interminable expert testimony”). Other
areas of the law, however, have not adopted complete prohibitions on such evidence despite its potential
expense.
291. Vessel et al., supra note 92, at 122.
292. W. Tecumseh Fitch, Antje von Graevenitz & Eric Nicolas, Bio-Aesthetics and the Aesthetic
Trajectory: A Dynamic Cognitive and Cultural Perspective, in NEUROAESTHETICS 59, 94 (Martin Skov
& Oshin Vartanian eds., 2009).
293. Not only would expert testimony help curb the influence of an idiosyncratic trier of fact who
fails to represent the “ordinary observer,” but a medium-specific approach to substantial similarity would
also do a better job of preserving the public domain than the universalist status quo. Artists rely on
knowledge about how the brain perceives visual images. For example, even as we evaluate images
holistically, we are deeply influenced by contrast. Yet this contrast, by itself, should not be protectable.
It is a technique or, as one commentator writes, a “perceptual fact.” Moon Hee Lee, Note, Seeing’s
Insight: Toward a Visual Substantial Similarity Test for Copyright Infringement of Pictorial, Graphic,
and Sculptural Works, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 833, 860–64 (2017). With further study, neuroscience could
offer a better means of separating unprotectable perceptual facts from protectable expression. Copyright
law already applies a specialized test for determining when visual works are eligible for copyright
protection. See Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017). New
information about how audiences appreciate different kinds of art shows that specialized tests for visual
substantial similarity are also appropriate.
294. See supra Part I.B.
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By prompting greater attention to the reactions of intended audiences,
surveys would alter the infringement analysis to better track the financial
and non-financial harms of infringement. To the extent that the substantial
similarity test is meant to assess economic harm from the defendant’s
copying, the reactions of people who will actually encounter the works
provides a better sense of this harm than the reactions of the general public
or individual triers of fact. Non-financial interests are also better represented
by intended audience members. In her study of the reasons artists create,
Jessica Silbey describes a desire to be known to a particular audience and to
cultivate a favorable reputation among that audience as central motivators,
not just a desire for financial remuneration. 295 If so, it makes sense to
position infringement according to the reactions of specific audiences for
the plaintiff’s and defendant’s works.
Surveys also offer the capability of assessing audience reactions in a
rapid manner that resembles the “spontaneous and immediate” aesthetic
experiences of audience members in the real world.296 If recreating audience
aesthetic judgment is the touchstone for substantial similarity, then the
jurors in the Led Zeppelin case should have been exposed to the relevant
“Taurus” and “Stairway to Heaven” compositions quickly and then asked
for their judgment. The limitations of the courtroom and the adversarial
process make it difficult to determine the “gut reaction” of the “casual
observer” to creative works, however. The trier of fact ends up seeing or
hearing the works at issue multiple times and deliberating over their
similarities or differences in a less than casual manner. By contrast, if
conducted the right way, surveys could more accurately sample the
immediate impressions of onlookers and then report that information to the
trier of fact.
Even if one believes that the aesthetic reaction of audience members is
the right metric for evaluating infringement, there are prudential
considerations when using surveys to gain insight into that reaction. Even
the best survey that sheds light on how people respond to creative works
cannot fully illuminate the complexities of this process. The concern here is
that embracing survey evidence will somehow leave out critical parts of the
aesthetic experience, potentially over or underprotecting deserving creative
works.297
295. JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 149–60 (2015).
296. See supra note 151.
297. There would also be concerns about survey accuracy. Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley,
The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1279–80 (2014). But there
is no reason to think that judges, in their gatekeeping function, could not screen out unreliable surveys
from probative ones, just as they do in other legal contexts.
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This objection deserves serious consideration and should help guide how
surveys can be used to inform the substantial similarity analysis. Because
our understanding of aesthetic reactions is far from perfect, survey evidence
of those reactions should only serve as a supplement to the infringement
calculation rather than the sole determinant.
Nevertheless, surveys of intended audiences should be permitted to aid
in the substantial similarity determination. As noted, copyright courts have
been hostile to surveys, refusing to allow them into the infringement
calculation at all.298 In the very few copyright cases weighing the value of a
proffered survey, there have been unfortunate mistakes in survey design.
The proffered surveys queried respondents on the likelihood of confusing
the defendant’s work with the plaintiff’s work, an issue more relevant for
trademark infringement than copyright infringement. 299 These mistakes
may not be the fault of clumsy survey designs, but rather stem from the
relative difficulty in figuring out how to interrogate particular audiences on
their aesthetic responses. After all, one cannot simply ask audience
members if they think one copyrighted work is “substantially similar” to the
other.
Yet it is not impossible to design a survey that is relevant to the
substantial similarity analysis. Irina Manta suggests that open-ended
questions allowing a respondent to choose a degree of similarity would be
appropriate. For example, members of the target audience could rate the
works at issue on a five-point scale, with one standing for “not at all similar”
and five for “very similar.”300 Surveys could also ask audiences to identify
the components of a copyrighted work that they found most noticeable or
enjoyable. Neuroimaging may offer valuable data for survey design,
indicating which parts of the works at issue are potentially most salient to
the relevant demographic.
Attention will also need to paid to the appropriate universe for a survey.
Purchasing records and market analyses could define a survey universe
based on the copyright holder’s existing and likely customer base. 301
Because authors routinely are motivated to create with a particular audience
in mind, contemporaneous evidence from the copyright holder may also
shed light on the appropriate audience to survey.302 Parties will no doubt
298. See supra Part I.A.
299. See Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods., 443 F. Supp. 291, 298–99, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
300. Jamie Lund, An Empirical Examination of the Lay Listener in Music Composition Copyright
Infringement, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 137, 155 & n.70 (2011); Manta, supra note 60, at 1352–53.
301. See Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 802–03 (4th Cir. 2001) (using “all
of the relevant evidence” to conclude that the intended audience for a copyrighted dinosaur costume was
“an audience consisting of young children,” not only adult renters and purchasers of the costume).
302. SILBEY, supra note 295, at 149–60.
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argue as to whether a proffered survey polled a truly representative sample.
Again, the perfect should not be the enemy of the good. Surveys are
routinely accepted in other areas of the law, including trademark law, and
courts are free to discount or even exclude a survey that takes too broad or
too narrow of a sample.303
Even if surveys offer incomplete information about audience thought,
they would provide more inputs for appreciating audience mindsets, thereby
prompting a salutary cognitive realignment. Today, we know little to
nothing about how judges and juries arrive at their infringement
determinations. Without guidance, people tend to evaluate scenarios from
their own perspective.304 It is likely that decisionmakers in copyright cases
are constantly failing to appreciate the perspective of relevant audiences,
even on those few occasions when they are instructed by courts to adopt that
perspective. They may need a legal nudge, in the form of survey evidence,
to approach the substantial similarity analysis from a different point of view.
3. Debiasing the Trier of Fact
As discussed above, in its current, amorphous form, the substantial
similarity test acts as a mechanism for importing societal norms into
copyright law.305 Even if one thinks the test should remain a mechanism for
reflecting these norms, this does not mean that it should operate as a vehicle
for subconscious bias. In most areas of the law, we do not believe that the
very act of setting boundaries on the mental calculations of the trier of fact,
regardless of the content of those boundaries, renders those calculations
unreliable. Jurors are not subatomic particles whose positions will
inevitably be disturbed by the act of trying to locate those positions.
Nevertheless, substantial similarity doctrine has long proceeded under just
such a belief about the fragility of the trier of fact. Believing “that one
simply could not reason about the aesthetic,” 306 courts tread extremely
lightly, worrying that attempts to specify infringement will disturb jurors’
mental calculations. If this agnostic approach to substantial similarity was
once justified given the absence of information as to how audiences actually
303. See, e.g., Hodgdon Powder Co. v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D.
Kan. 2007); Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, 850 F. Supp. 232, 240–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
304. Fromer & Lemley, supra note 297, at 1283 (“Cognitive science studies demonstrate that
people tend to use themselves to simulate the mental states of others . . . .”); Manta, supra note 57, at
1353 (“If presented with the perceptions of numerous members of the intended audience, jurors and
judges are more likely to reach the optimal result than if they are told that their own perceptions are the
relevant ones or that they need to deduce what an abstract, average, reasonable observer would
perceive.”).
305. See supra Part III.A.2.
306. Beebe, supra note 74, at 341.
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appreciate art, neuroscientific discoveries make the justification no longer
tenable. The law is filled with mechanisms designed to debias and improve
legal decisionmaking.307 Copyright infringement should no longer be any
different.308
Neuroaesthetic research argues for one concrete doctrinal debiasing
innovation: the trier of fact should evaluate substantial similarity before
determining whether actual copying took place. A common complaint about
the current infringement paradigm is that judges and juries are biased by
whatever determination they make about whether copying occurred when
deciding whether that copying is improper. Keep in mind that there are two
separate steps to the infringement analysis. 309 First, there must be a
determination of whether copying took place. At this step, the trier of fact
can be aided by expert testimony and may dissect the works into their
component parts for comparison. Here, the decision is whether similarities
are probative of copying, not whether that copying is substantial enough to
be considered improper. Only after this first step is there a comparison of
the target audience’s aesthetic response to the two works, an evaluation that
currently precludes expert guidance or dissection.
The problem with the present ordering of these two separate stages of
the infringement analysis is that the copying in fact step may skew the trier
of fact’s assessment of substantial similarity. The copying in fact analysis
considers copying of either protectable or unprotectable expression as
probative. The danger is that once any copying has been found, that initial
finding will spill over into the separate question of whether this copying was
improper. As one court noted, once a jury has been exposed to expert
testimony on the separate issue of “copying in fact,” it cannot “forget that
307. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 403; see also Maggie Wittlin, Hindsight Evidence, 116 COLUM. L. REV.
1323, 1367 (2016) (discussing use of jury instructions to combat hindsight bias in jurors).
308. This should in no way suggest that neuroscientific evidence of audience reaction will act as
a perfect tool for reforming copyright decisionmaking. There is the real danger that judges or jurors
could be biased by the neuroscientific evidence itself. Inexperienced parties tend to be too persuaded by
pictures showing activation in particular areas of the brain, even if those areas of activation have nothing
to do with the phenomenon being interrogated. See, e.g., Diego Fernandez-Duque, Jessica Evans, Colton
Christian & Sara D. Hodges, Superfluous Neuroscience Information Makes Explanations of
Psychological Phenomena More Appealing, 27 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 926, 926 (2015)
(describing how “superfluous neuroscience information increased the judged quality of the argument for
both good and bad explanations”); David P. McCabe, Alan Castel & Matthew G. Rhodes, The Influence
of fMRI Lie Detection Evidence on Juror Decision-Making, 29 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 566, 566 (2011)
(“Results showed that fMRI lie detection evidence led to more guilty verdicts than lie detection evidence
based on polygraph evidence, thermal facial imaging, or a control condition that did not include lie
detection evidence.”). But explanation and cautionary instructions are a better way to correct our
tendency to have too much faith in brain science than refusing to consider that science altogether. See
id. (“However, when the validity of the fMRI lie detection evidence was called into question on crossexamination, guilty verdicts were reduced to the level of the control condition.”).
309. See supra Part I.A.
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evidence in analyzing the problem” of substantial similarity.310
A way to help with this problem is to reverse the order of the two
analyses. The trier of fact should decide substantial similarity first. If there
is a conclusion that the two works are substantially similar, then there can
be an examination of copying in fact.311
Although one might worry that this resequencing will cause the
substantial similarity analysis to improperly influence the copying in fact
test, this seems less likely than the reverse. Copying in fact is much more of
a structured analysis than substantial similarity. It permits analytical
dissection and expert testimony about which kinds of similarities should be
considered probative. As a result, even when substantial similarity is found,
this finding is unlikely to stampede the more bounded copying in fact
analysis.
This idea about reordering the infringement decision has been suggested
before. 312 It should be given even more serious consideration given the
teachings of neuroaesthetics. In addition to serving a debiasing function,
reversing the order of the two components to infringement would better
recreate the timing of aesthetic encounters. In an early formulation of the
audience test, the Ninth Circuit proposed a waiting period between the
observer’s experience of one work and her experience of another. The court
described the test as inquiring whether an ordinary observer, “given an
interval of two or three weeks between a casual reading of [plaintiff’s] story
and a similar uncritical view of [defendant’s work],” would perceive the
former in the latter.313 Although this staggered reading of the two works
proved too inefficient to implement, the motivating idea seems to be that
310. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3d Cir. 1986) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d
914, 920 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that even a “properly instructed” juror will have difficulty separating
the copying in fact and substantial similarity analyses).
311. In Led Zeppelin, the original Ninth Circuit panel concluded that it was reversible error when
the trial court refused to let the plaintiff play a sound recording of “Taurus” as part of the copying in fact
part of the case. The plaintiff sought to play the sound recording in front of Led Zeppelin lead guitarist
Jimmy Page to help prove that Page had access to “Taurus” and did not independently create the song’s
signature guitar riff. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2018). The danger,
however, is that the jury would also use the sound recording (Wolfe’s copyright only extended to the
“Taurus” sheet music and not any associated recordings) to judge substantial similarity. “You can’t unhear what you have already heard,” chastised one expert. Stephen Carlisle, Stairway to Nowhere: Court
Reverses Verdict in Favor of Led Zeppelin (Oct. 11, 2018), http://copyright.nova.edu/led-zeppelin/ [https
://perma.cc/9QPT-R4TT]. Hearing the case en banc, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial judge had
been correct in preventing the jury from hearing the sound recording given the potential of the recording
to prejudice the jury’s substantial similarity deliberations. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051,
1064 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). If substantial similarity was determined before copying in fact, one
would not have the same concerns with jury bias.
312. Balganesh, supra note 4, at 858–62; Manta, supra note 60, at 1349–50.
313. Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 27 (9th Cir. 1933).
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the essence of creative works can best be ascertained through immediate
experience with those works. Infringement should not be assessed by a
labored comparison of one work to another, lest that creative essence
somehow become overlooked or fade under the pressure of a more logical
comparison. Better to engage in a fast, “casual” review in order to discern
the work’s aesthetic value.314 In general, courts fear that too much time with
a work causes deliberation to trump instinct, making the observer’s
impression less probative of infringement. 315 Neuroscientific research
reveals that there is some truth to these judicial suppositions. Reversing the
order of the two central infringement determinations would help facilitate a
more accurate rendering of an audience’s “spontaneous and immediate”
impressions.316
CONCLUSION
The current substantial similarity analysis uses the aesthetic judgment of
audiences to determine whether one work infringes the copyright of another.
Copyright law deems aesthetic judgment inherently subjective and,
therefore, not susceptible to measurement or the imposition of objective
criteria. At the same time, the law considers aesthetic judgment universal,
making attention to audience differences largely unnecessary. By offering
empirical evidence of audience attention and pleasure, neuroaesthetic
research refutes these judicial suppositions about art appreciation. It turns
out both that we can measure aesthetic experiences to some degree and that
these experiences vary depending on audience and artistic medium.
Neural imaging of audiences is unlikely to replace the substantial
similarity test wholesale. We won’t simply put sample viewers in fMRI
314. Fulks v. Knowles-Carter, 207 F. Supp. 3d 274, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); see also M & D Int’l
Corp. v. Chan, 901 F. Supp. 1502, 1511 n.3 (D. Haw. 1995) (questioning copyrightability of sculpture
given that “only minor differences not readily apparent to the casual observer characterize the overall
aesthetic appeal” of the work at issue versus competing works); Judscott Handprints, Ltd. v. Washington
Wall Paper Co., 377 F. Supp. 1372, 1376 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (“To the casual observer, a glance at each
would reveal little to distinguish [the wall coverings at issue], save the varying widths of the angular
striping and the detailing of the bamboo. While closer scrutiny reveals actual design differences of size,
spacing and the abovementioned detailing on the bamboo, these are, in a non-aesthetic sense, relatively
insignificant to the structure and repeat of the design as a whole.”).
315. See Fromer & Lemley, supra note 297, at 1279 (describing difficulty inherent in recreating
“the mindset of consumers in the actual marketplace,” including the problem of matching the multi-day
deliberative process in the courtroom with a fast-paced marketplace experience).
316. Peel & Co. v. Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 2001). By expanding the amount of
information available for the substantial similarity analysis, my first suggestion—allowing in expert
testimony as to differences in artistic mediums—will make it somewhat more difficult to get a truly
immediate reaction from the trier of fact. Still, even under these conditions, a reordering of the test for
infringement will help debias the substantial similarity determination while allowing for more rapid
assessments of aesthetic appeal.
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machines, expose them to the works at issue, and then look for one neural
pattern for infringement and another for permissible copying. There are
significant limitations on what brain-imaging technologies can detect when
it comes to the complex neural processes involved in aesthetic judgment.
Instead, as in other areas of the law, neuroscience seems ripe for making
inroads into the infringement analysis without supplanting it. If done the
right way, brain science can improve our controversial system for
determining copyright infringement. We understand the audiences for
creative works much better than we did even a few years ago. That
understanding should be leveraged to rehabilitate the law of substantial
similarity.

